Saturday, May 31, 2014

Obama's West Point Speech and the three capitalists' internecine struggles

Last Wednesday, President Obama spoke to the West Point graduating class.  The text is after the jump.

The speech was billed as a new departure on foreign policy.  It seemed to me as a speech designed as ammunition for Democrats in the Fall Congressional elections, and as it should have been.  Now is not the time for new, challenging ideas.  Now is the time to increase Democrats' control of Congress.  The speech, I thought, effectively rebutted the Tea Party and McCain-Graham bickering: unwise demagoguery.

I didn't see anything in the speech that was objectionable, and much that was conventional and nevertheless wise, and a great relief after a decades of Republican warmongering.

Here's the Guardian's take, not flattering, not damning, on the  speech. The Guardian's mild objections are as much beside the real point as was the speech itself.  What I wanted to hear was how we are to help moderate the three major centers of Capital when they have not adopted rules of normative behavior for themselves.  Therein lies the greatest danger in the world.

For more information on the lawless Capitalist conflicts, se Slavoj Žižek's interview on the Guardian.

For the reactionary response to the President, se the Wall Street Journal's editorial.

Obama's speech marked the end of a war-laden chapter for the US – with little clear idea of what the next chapter should really mean. Photograph: Jim Watson / AFP / Getty

Even before President Obama spoke to the US military academy at West Point on Wednesday, the White House trumpeted his commencement address as offering a unifying vision of US foreign policy – one that is "both interventionist and internationalist, but not isolationist or unilateral".

With an introduction like that, it came as a welcome surprise that the speech was merely intelligible. I liked the anti-thoughtless-intervention line – "Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail" – but much of the nearly hour-long speech was a dull checklist of world problems (and the UN Law of the Sea Convention!), most addressed by the routine oversimplifications required on such occasions.

Obama's "vision" was peppered with confusing vocabulary about "realists" and "interventionists", both depicted as straw men, and too many predictable bromides about international cooperation, democracy and "human dignity". And I say this as a former speechwriter who also used to lean on such filler.

There was no over-arching theme to this rhetoric, save Obama's recommitment to American exceptionalism ("with every fiber of my being") and his rejection of mindless invasions. Not much to disagree with there, but not much new either. One couldn't avoid the impression that this speech marked the end of a war-laden chapter for the US – with little clear idea of what the next chapter should really mean, save the repetitious evocation of "American leadership".

The leitmotif of Obama's foreign policy – and the first item of his West Point talk – is withdrawal, as Tuesday's announcement about drawdown in Afghanistan reconfirmed. So what about the rest of Obama's foreign policy?

Facts, not rhetoric, paint a picture of this administration's troubling and often counterproductive inconsistency abroad. There is some good, but there is plenty that's really bad.


From drones and emissions, to the South China Sea to Somalia to the Crimea and back again, it's not easy connect the many dots of America's foreign policies. Because aside from tortured rhetoric, unified they are not.

For the text of the President's speech,

Friday, May 9, 2014

South Sudan and China's dependence and new foreign policy

In the wake of the UN report on South Sudan of crimes against humanity committed by both sides in the revolution taking place there, I thought it useful to look again at China's stake and participation in South Sudan.

From Foreign Policy Review, April 24, 2p14

The disintegration of South Sudan, the world's newest country, is driving a foreign-policy shift in one of the world's oldest.
  • BY KEITH JOHNSON
  • APRIL 24, 2014
  • The maelstrom of violence in South Sudan shows no signs of abating, with rebel forces reportedly advancing on a pair of key oil-producing regions and massacred civilians piling up by the hundreds. The horrors have prompted outrage from senior officials at the United Nations and the United States -- but the biggest potential impact from the unrest could occur thousands of miles away, in Beijing.
The disintegration of the world's newest country is driving a profound shift in one of the world's oldest. China, which for decades has sought to pair globe-trotting economic ambitions with an inviolable "non-interference" approach to other countries' affairs, is departing from tradition to take an increasingly active role in the Sudan crisis.
China's African envoy, Zhong Jianhua, has blitzed the region in recent months trying to help craft a solution for South Sudan's internal strife, a stark contrast to the much-criticized, stand-off position China held just a few years ago when Khartoum ran roughshod over civilians but kept sending plenty of oil to Beijing. In February, Zhong told Reuters that China's hands-on approach to South Sudan represents a "new chapter" in Beijing's millennial foreign policy. Earlier this year, Zhong offered to facilitate mediations between the country's warring factions designed to wind down the fighting.
"China is taking a more active interest. They are trying to figure out just what it means to be a responsible, rising power," said Deborah Brautigam, an expert on Africa at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.



"China is taking a more active interest. They are trying to figure out just what it means to be a responsible, rising power," said Deborah Brautigam, an expert on Africa at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. "Right now, Sudan is kind of the test case for how do you do shuttle diplomacy, how do you do negotiations, how do you try to be a peacekeeper, how do you take on a greater global role."
Beijing has already sharply ramped up its participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities and other international endeavors that it once denounced as interference in the sovereign affairs of other states. China is the biggest single contributor of U.N. peacekeepers, but they have almost always played support roles far from the front lines. Last year, however, China dispatched combat troops to Mali to help reduce tensions in the country's restive north, a first for Beijing.
To be sure, Beijing's willingness to inject itself into the South Sudanese crisis is driven by the simple fact that China buys almost 80 percent of South Sudanese oil exports and has watched with alarm as the current fighting has crippled the country's ability to produce and export oil to customers in Asia. Oil production in both Sudans has dropped from a peak of about 480,000 barrels a day in 2010 to about 160,000 barrels today, and even that last bit is under pressure from rebels in South Sudan, who have ordered international oil companies to pack up and leave as part of a strategy to cut off the main economic lifeline of the South Sudanese government.
China may also not have much of a choice. The cease-fire in South Sudan brokered in early 2014 imploded in the last week, with rebels advancing on key cities in oil-producing regions and slaughtering civilians as they went. The political nature of the fighting -- which pits Salva Kiir's South Sudanese government forces against rebels led by Riek Machar -- has by some accounts descended into an ethnic bloodletting. China has been caught in the middle; a pair of its oil workers were abducted by Machar's forces last week and Chinese oil firms have been told to leave the country.
The U.N. and the South Sudanese government blamed Machar's rebel forces for the purported slaughter of hundreds of civilians in the atrocities in the oil capital of Bentiu; Machar denied his troops were responsible. Samantha Power, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., decried the violence on Thursday, calling it "outrageous" and saying that "the world's newest state is clearly on a precipice."
China's traditional interests in both Sudan and South Sudan, and its newfound interest as a mediator, were on full display in the wake of the attacks. China's foreign ministry on Wednesday "strongly condemned" the killings in Bentiu and called on "relevant parties in South Sudan to resolve their issues by pushing forward political dialogue and achieve reconciliation." But the ministry also called on South Sudan's government to better protect Chinese oil firms and workers there after the two workers were abducted last week.
Oil markets are not panicking about the interruptions to South Sudanese production the way they did late last year when rebels first threatened the country's oil fields. That is partly because escalating tensions in Ukraine weigh more heavily on energy markets, but also because South Sudan's oil sector has essentially gone walkabout since the country achieved independence from the north in 2011.
Oil production has fallen by half, even in relatively peaceful times, and oil exports have fallen even further due to disputes between Juba and Khartoum over how to share the proceeds of oil exports; the only pipeline to the sea goes north through Sudan. That is bad news for South Sudan, which the World Bank describes as "the most oil dependent country in the world," with oil accounting for about 97 percent of government revenues.
Despite the relatively paltry quantities, South Sudan's oil is still important to China, the world's biggest oil importer. In 2011, China bought about 80 percent of South Sudan's exports, or roughly 260,000 barrels a day; that provided 5 percent of China's crude oil imports. In 2012, the latest year for which full data is available, South Sudan exported about 50,000 barrels a day to China, or 1 percent of that country's imports. In percentage terms, South Sudan -- when its export capacity is at full blast -- provides a greater share of Chinese oil imports than Kuwait or Iraq do for the United States, underscoring its importance as a long-term source of supply for Beijing.
In the past, that kind of economic interest shaped China's view of Sudan as well as most other countries in which it did business. For years, China invested in, and bought oil, from the outcast regime of Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir; China also had friendly relations with a host of other rogue nations, from Libya to North Korea and Myanmar, that faced a battery of sanctions and other restrictions imposed by the West.
Much of that began to change in 2011. The civil uprising in Libya forced China to rethink its support for Muammar al-Qaddafi, and in fact China supported modest United Nations sanctions on leading Libyan officials. The hurried evacuation of Chinese civilians from Libya that year also brought home to Beijing the need to match security capabilities with its investment reach, lessons which are being applied in the rest of Africa today.
Likewise, the creation of South Sudan as an independent state in 2011 forced Beijing to recalibrate its relations with Khartoum and Juba, since most of the oil fields are in the newly independent south.
To be sure, oil still looms large in China's view of what's at stake in the Sudan crisis; last year, Princeton Lyman, the former U.S. envoy to South Sudan, criticized China for worrying more about the secure supply of crude than finding a solution to South Sudan's political problems. But in general, U.S. diplomats working in South Sudan have praised China's newfound political engagement.
So far, China's active diplomacy to find a solution for South Sudan's domestic woes has not been repeated in other countries. Beijing has maintained a relatively hands-off role regarding the crises in Syria and Ukraine, and China's forays into Middle East diplomacy have been limited to ensuring the free flow of energy resources, rather than dabbling in internal politics.
Still, the Sudan experiment could well serve as a template for China's future foreign policy, as the country learns how to leverage its influence rather than just its economic heft, Brautigam said.
"They'll do it in one place, and experiment, and learn from that, and I think that's what they're doing in Sudan," she said.

Sunday, May 4, 2014

The New Silk Road


First is a news article from the Express Tribune, with the International New York Times.  It describes current a propose economic cooperation between Pakistan and China.  There is much talk of mutual friendship.

Mentioned by the Chinese ambassador are

Neelum Jhelum Hydropower Project, t
he largest man-made object
 in the world.

Proposed routes for both TAPA, s
upported by the US and China, 
and IP, weakly supported by China and vigorously opposed by the US.

Feasibility studies for a railroad link from the Chinese-owned Gwadar  deep-water port in southern Pakistan to China have been let by China and Pakistan.. China sees both financial and strategic advantages to the railway:  strategic, because oil could be transported from the Persian Gulf, undeterred by the US Fifth Fleet.


The second, from the Center for Global Development, details US economic aid to Pakistan over time.  In general, a lot of money went for "security", and the aid money has not been productively spent.

Pakistani are said to hate Americans, in part because of the drum-beat of hatred toward the West in the Saud-funded Madrases scattered throughout Pakistan; and in part because the "collateral damage" of US drone strikes raise intense animosity from the extended families, numbering millions, of those killed or wounded or financially ruined.  See, e.g., A Refusal to Mourn the Death, by Fire, of a Child in Yemen.

We could pressure the Saudi to change their drumbeat to a pro-Western one and it would be a major effort, probably including military action.  The Saudis rule over a minority population with unrivaled ferocity and they fear the consequences of Democracy and the Rule of Law above all things. 


There is no reason why the US must take all  the burn for the drone strikes, except that we want to keep a monopoly on drone technology for a while longer. Islamic radicals harm Western Europe, Russia, and China much more than they harm the US, and our drone strikes protect the World; only we take the born for them.

That burn is a necessary concomitant to global hegemony; I'm pleased that we are the "Hedgemon" (there is such a word:  'one (as a political state) possessing hegemony'"); and not please with the consequences.  

We could become great friends with Pakistan and friendship would greatly bolster our competitive advantage over China, but for the drone strikes, which we could share with other nations, and but for our decades-long commitment to prevent Iran from exporting its natural resources.  Pakistan desperately needs Iranian natural gas, and the US won't even let Ernst and Whinny participate in financing he Pakistan portion of a pipeline 

We have prevailed so far in boxing Iran, for nothing of value to the Nation in return, though the value to the Saudi and their economic  friends is great (see US, Chevron, China, and Central Asia); we will not prevail in the long run,; the world hunger for oil is too great.  And we will have lost a lot when we finally fail.


China has a natural advantage in its relations with all of Central Asia: the nations share the same land mass.  The US is protected from foreign wars, so far, be giant oceans, and disadvantaged by those same oceans when it comes to exerting influence over Asian nations.  Our great Navy of-sets the disadvantages, and cannot match the Chinese Gwadar port in South Pakistan, or an express highway running from China to Pakistan.