Death, starvation haunt southern Yemen

You know that Yemen is besieged and starving as a result of the long civil war, made impossibly longer by  naval an air bombardment and blockades by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, with shameful support from the United State and Great Britain.

Surprising are two paragraphs near the usual recital of genocide:

UTHOR

Ashraf al-Falahi

POSTED

February 23, 2016

Taiz is of great symbolic value, for it is the capital of the most populous governorate in the country and the first to rise against Saleh in 2011 during the Arab Spring. But the forces loyal to current President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi — which include a coalition spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and backed by the United States — have been slow to retake the city, which allowed the Iran-backed (?) Houthis to tighten the siege. That sluggish response cannot be divorced from the disagreement between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi Arabia-UAE dispute revolves around the resistance's leadership in Taiz, which is made up mainly of members of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah Party), affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.  

While Saudi Arabia has expressed considerable openness toward the Islah-led resistance, Abu Dhabi has taken an opposing stance. As clearly evidenced by the statements of Emirati officials, this indicates that the war in Yemen is being fought not against the Houthis, but against those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.

See Saud- United Arab Emirates split; Saud falsely blame Iran for Yemen

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Taiz, then:

Queen sElizabeth's visit, during the mush-missed British protectorate

Taiz now, images form google images for the pst week

A boy walks along a street in Taiz after an explosion REUTERS.jpg

Saud- United Arab Emirates split; Saudi Arabia's intransigence; battle for Aleppo

The article reprinted here is especially interesting for this quotation:

 "It's the only game in town," says Yousef Al Otaiba, the United Arab Emirates' ambassador to Washington, of Kerry's diplomatic effort. "I don't see any other strategy for now."

The quotation suggests a split in the Gulf Cooperation Council ranks. I doubt hat Saudi Arabia agrees with a Kerry's cease fire efforts.

Will the United Arab Emirates use United States' mercenaries to train Syrian Sunni fighters in its name? The United Arab Emirates likely does't have the capability to train anyone on anything without the United States' mercenary help.

The article could do without the neoconic carping on the president’s “past mistakes in Syria.”  No sensible alternatives have been proposed, given Congressional Republicans’ recalcitrance. But blaming congressional Republicans isn’t a neoconic thing to do and the article's author is neoconic.

The basic problem in Syria is that the Saudi will not give up their billion dollar support for Salafi Jihadist fighters, their main hope of establishing a Wahhabist state in Syria (a horror for the Syrian people); nor their determination to keep Iran from transporting oil to Europe through Syria. 

The United States Congress is also unwilling to give up its decades-long effort to bottle up Iranian oil, at Saud bidding.  The president does not share that fading illusion and still must block the IP Pipeline in spite of  harming relations with Pakistan more.

A Pivotal Moment in a Tangled War

By David Ignatius

February 19, 2016

WASHINGTON -- Blaming President Obama for his past mistakes in Syria may be satisfying, and is largely deserved, but it's not a policy. This is the most complicated battlefield the world has seen in decades, and the next moves by the U.S. and its allies have to be deliberate, and carefully considered.

     The U.S. should move forward with the cease-fire process begun by Secretary of State John Kerry a week ago in Munich. Yes, it's a long shot, and woefully dependent on Russian "goodwill." But it offers a chance to reduce the suffering of the Syrian people and save lives, and it should be pursued awhile longer. If diplomacy fails, what comes next will be much worse for everyone.

     "It's the only game in town," says Yousef Al Otaiba, the United Arab Emirates' ambassador to Washington, of Kerry's diplomatic effort. "I don't see any other strategy for now."

     If Russia is sabotaging cease-fire hopes by continuing to bomb Syrian civilians, then the U.S. and its allies should focus international indignation on Moscow. Yes, Kerry may have been overly optimistic in making the Munich deal, but the Russians signed it -- and they should be held accountable if it fails.

     In the Syrian nightmare, even small steps forward are notable. So this week's move to send relief to five besieged areas around Damascus shouldn't be dismissed. This humanitarian assistance was part of the Munich agreement, and U.S. officials say the aid convoys moved into some of the towns on Wednesday. It's a fragile, first step toward de-escalation, but it's a positive sign.

     The "cessation of hostilities" that Kerry negotiated on paper was supposed to begin Friday, but it won't. That's partly because the Russians have continued their assaults on rebel areas. It's also partly because the opposition hasn't yet signaled clearly that it's willing to stand down. Given the opposition's weakness, this reluctance to embrace a truce is understandable, but it's wrong. Any chance to reduce violence and create space for political discussion should be seized.

     The battlefield around Aleppo is a mess -- a crosshatch of different combatants and foreign forces. Within a small area are Syrian regime forces backed by Russia and Iran; Kurdish rebel forces backed by the U.S.; Turkish forces that are shelling the U.S.-backed Kurds; Arab rebel fighters supported by the CIA and Saudi intelligence; Jabhat al-Nusra fighters allied with al-Qaeda; and Islamic State fighters, who want to kill all of the above.

     A full cease-fire in this landscape is impossible right now -- and not just because Kerry has been too trusting of the Russians. The combatants have to sort themselves out. Rebels will vote with their feet whether to ally with Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State. Saudi Arabia and other Arab patrons will have to lean hard on "moderate" rebels to pull them toward the cease-fire group and away from the terrorists.

     If the Russians keep bombing the rebels around Aleppo, willy-nilly, that will sabotage any hope of a truce. Here again, blame Moscow if it blocks de-escalation.

     Going forward, the U.S. needs more military leverage to match Russia. That may be coming, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE offering to send special forces into Syria, under overall U.S. command. Details are still being discussed, but the UAE appears willing to train Sunni fighters inside Syria -- helping to fill a hole in U.S. strategy. These forces might be part of an eventual strike against Raqqa, the Islamic State's self-proclaimed capital in eastern Syria.

     The U.S. campaign against the Islamic State continues, mostly invisibly. The key U.S. allies have been fighters from the Syrian Kurdish group known as the YPG, which has now been rebranded as the "Syrian Democratic Forces." This week, about 6,000 fighters moved to attack al-Shaddadi, a town about 50 miles east of Raqqa. This force included about 2,500 Arabs. Overall, the SDF umbrella group now numbers about 40,000, of which 7,000 are Arabs.

     The Syrian Kurds have been the toughest and most effective fighters in this conflict. Their success seems to have panicked Turkey, which claims the Syrian Kurds are terrorists. The Turks have been shelling YPG positions in northwest Syria -- even as these fighters (with quiet U.S. support) have been attacking Islamic State positions near Aleppo. What a crazy war -- with a NATO member (Turkey) attacking America's best allies in Syria (the Kurds)!

     The Syrian conflict is at a critical, delicate moment. A miscalculation by Russia or Turkey could be catastrophic. It's never too late for the U.S. to do the right thing -- which is to build, carefully, the political and military framework for a new Syria.

(c) 2016, Washington Post Writers Group

Saud falsely blame Iran for Yemen

Western new outlets assert that Yemen is a proxy war for Iran's struggle against Saudi Arabia.  That is a position the Saudi have assiduously promoted as a justification fora its genocide in Yemen.  See Time, The Arabian country has become the scene of the Middle East's second proxy war; DW, Power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran hampers peace process; the egregious Saudi propaganda piece in Arab News, Iranian cruelty against Yemen civilians rapped.

Not so, according to ForeignAffairs Magazine, a a scholarly, careful, and generally neoconic publication that one would expect to support the Saudi.  A perceptive, historically accurate account of Yemen.

From foreignPolicy Magazine:

SNAPSHOT April 19, 2015  

Iran's Game in Yemen

Why Tehran Isn't to Blame for the Civil War

By Mohsen Milani

In the past four years, Saudi Arabia has used its military to intervene in both Bahrain and Yemen. Its rationale in both cases: To protect those Arab countries from “Persian subversion.” In its discussions of foreign policy, Riyadh portrays Iran as a hegemonic power whose nefarious support of its Shia Houthi proxy precipitated a civil war in Yemen—a struggle the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir, describes as being “between good and evil.”  

But Saudi Arabia is grossly exaggerating Iran’s power in Yemen to justify its own expansionist ambitions. Iran is not the cause of the civil war, nor are the Houthis its proxy. Chaos, not Iran, controls Yemen. With no vital economic or strategic interests in Yemen, Iran has, for the last few years, only opportunistically supported the Houthis to create a political sphere of influence. It did so through soft power and with minimal investment because the Houthis have been more interested in Iran than Iran has been in them. Of course, Iran, like the international community, is deeply concerned about the security of the Bab el-Mandeb strait in Yemen through which millions of dollars worth of oil flows, but it will not get militarily engaged in the lingering civil war, since Tehran correctly believes there is no military solution to the conflict. Now, no Saudi aerial bombardment of Yemen, or even boots on the ground, will defeat the Houthis or stop the expansion of Iran’s influence in Yemen. 

 •  •  •

In the first war, Hussein was killed by Yemeni government forces, but the movement he led thrived as his brother, Abdulamlik al-Houthi, took the helm. In 2009, the clashes between the government and the Houthis reached a climax when the Saudi Air Force joined the Yemeni government. The joint operation was unsuccessful and the Houthis temporarily captured two villages inside Saudi territory. At that time, the Saudis reportedly began to depopulate some border areas insides the kingdom’s territory where the local population had shown some sympathy toward the Zaydis.    

After that, the war dragged on. The Houthis proposed inviting Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq’s most popular Shia leader known for his moderation, to mediate between the warring parties. But the appeal landed on deaf ears. A Saudi cleric, Mohammad Al-Arifi, dismissed Sistani as “an infidel.” Meanwhile, the Houthis became ideologically ever closer to Tehran

To the Houthis, the Arab Spring’s arrival in Yemen in early 2011 was a gift. When the people took to the streets in support of democracy, the previously undemocratic Houthis joined them. The growing protest movement ended Saleh’s 37-year rule and his Vice-President, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, won in an uncontested presidential race. The rule of the Saudi-supported Hadi was short-lived, however. Saleh and his vast network within the armed forces and intelligence agencies joined the Houthis to overthrow Hadi,[Not mentioned is that Saleh was allowed, by the Saudi, the GCC, an the US, to leave Yemen with $60bm, which no doubt is being used to fund the ciil war.] who escaped to Saudi Arabia. Today, the Houthis and their partners control Sanaa and most of Yemen. The Houthis, who have committed acts of terror and intimidation, could not have made rapid advances without a tactic alliance with Saleh, their old nemesis. Saudi Arabia has zeroed in on the Houthis as if they alone are responsible for the mess.

REGIONAL RIVALS

The civil war in Yemen, the Arab world’s poorest country, is a reflection of a fierce struggle between diverse sects and tribes, each with its own questionable past allegiances and activities. It would be disingenuous to fully blame Iran and portray Saudi Arabia as a benevolent power.

The nature and extent of Iranian involvement has been exaggerated and sometimes deliberately distorted. For example, according to a WikiLeaks document, when Saleh was briefed that year about an American drone crashing on Yemeni soil, he publicly insisted that the drone was Iranian and that it was collecting intelligence. Then in 2009, Yemen seized a small boat in its territorial waters and claimed that it contained Iranian weapons and cash destined to reach the Houthis. Iran denied the charges. 

In a secret cable to Washington, U.S. Ambassador Stephen Seche wrote that “most local political analysts report that the Houthis obtained their weapons from the Yemeni black market.” He quoted a high-ranking Yemeni official saying that the Houthis “easily obtain weapons from inside Yemen, either from battlefield captures or by buying them from corrupt military commanders and soldiers....The military covers up its failures by saying the weapons come from Iran.”

Likewise, claims in 2015 that “there are 5,000 Iranian, Hezbollah, and Shi’a militia from Iraq in Yemen,” as an unidentified official from the Gulf Cooperation Council put it, are unsubstantiated. For its part, the United States admits as much. In an April statement, Jen Psaki, spokesperson for the State Department, stated that “The U.S. is concerned about Iran’s relations with the Houthis and that the U.S. has evidence of all kinds of support to Houthis, but, we have no evidence that Iran controls the actions of Houthis.”

To be sure, despite the lack of conclusive evidence, it would not be far-fetched to conclude that the hardliners in Iran may have provided limited military and financial support to the Houthis, starting in 2009. Even so, these weapons have not decisively altered the balance of forces in the civil war.

Unquestionably, there are remarkable similarities in the political and ideological orientation of the Houthis and the Islamic Republic. Nor is there any doubt that Iran seeks to expand its influence in Yemen. There are reports that Iranian and Iraqi Shia seminaries have trained Zaydi clerics. In the past few months, a few Houthi delegations traveled to Tehran and signed various economic agreements with Iran. Since February 2015, there have been daily direct flights from Tehran to Sanaa. Iran has also pledged to expand the Al Hudaydah Port, which is close to the Straight of Bab-el-Mandeb that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden; to export oil to Yemen for a year, although the terms of the deal are not known; to build a new electrical power plant; and to send experts on electricity and transportation to Yemen. But they’ve been doing that for a while. In January 2015, Hadi, who now calls the Houthis “stooges of Iran,” also asked for greater cooperation from Iran to resolve regional issues and invited Iranian companies to invest in Yemen.

COSTLY CONFLICT

Because of the conflict’s complicated nature, Saudi Arabia’s military intervention is a strategic blunder that will exacerbate the war, allow terrorists in the area to expand their operations, and create a humanitarian disaster. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has already gained some territory in Yemen and is revitalized, which will complicate U.S. counterterrorism operations in the region. Putting boots on the ground, as Saudi Arabia and a few Arab countries have threatened to do, will create a quagmire from which they will not be able to easily escape.

A man looks at damage in his house caused by an air strike that hit a nearby army weapons depot in Sanaa, April 18, 2015.

KHALED ABDULLAH / REUTERS 

It is not entirely clear why the Saudis decided to intervene in Yemen. Perhaps, the Kingdom hoped to reverse evolving strategic changes in the region that it deems antithetical to its interests. The Kingdom lost its most powerful Sunni ally in Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003.  Today, Baghdad is controlled by the Shias. In Bahrain, the large Shia majority remains restive and is challenging the Saudi-backed, Sunni-controlled government there. Despite Saudi Arabia’s desire to see Assad go, he remains in power. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has become a force to be reckoned with. Saudi Arabia sees Iran’s fingerprints behind these huge changes and is, justifiably, concerned about their impact on its own considerable Shia population. Already, they have tipped the balance of power in the strategic competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Iran’s favor. So the Saudis might have decided to act preemptively in Yemen to prevent Iran from consolidating its presence in that country. Another plausible explanation is that the Saudis panicked about the possibility of a nuclear agreement with Iran and a subsequent U.S. rapprochement with Tehran. Perhaps the Kingdom hopes to turn its anti-Houthi coalition into an anti-Iran coalition.  [Not mentioned is the possibility, often mentioned, that the genocide in Yemen is the new Saud kins's attempt o persuade its own clergy that he can be relied on to protect Wahhabism.]

It isn’t too late to turn things around. The war in Yemen will require a ceasefire followed by negotiations among all major Yemeni parties who come together, through popular elections, to form a broad-based government, which is very likely to include the Houthis. The problem is that the Saudis might reject this partly because they do not wish to see an independent and representative government that has the slightest tendency toward  populism or elections. But facts on the ground will compel the Saudis to readjust their policy.

As civilian causalities increase in Yemen, the United States will face a difficult choice. On one hand, Washington appears to know that aerial bombardment, or sending troops, will not result in the kind of changes the Saudis are seeking in Yemen. On the other hand, Washington’s main preoccupation in Yemen is its counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has benefited enormously from Saudi military operations. At the same time, the Houthis have proven to be the most ferocious and effective enemy of the terrorist group and have shown willingness to cooperate with the United States in its counterterrorism operations.  

As civilian causalities increase in Yemen, the United States will face a difficult choice. On one hand, Washington appears to know that aerial bombardment, or sending troops, will not result in the kind of changes the Saudis are seeking in Yemen. On the other hand, Washington’s main preoccupation in Yemen is its counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has benefited enormously from Saudi military operations. At the same time, the Houthis have proven to be the most ferocious and effective enemy of the terrorist group and have shown willingness to cooperate with the United States in its counterterrorism operations. 

As for Iran, it must continue to refrain from getting militarily entangled in Yemen, where it has no national interests. Nor should Tehran provide weapons to the Houthis. Iran has already overextended itself in the region. It is high time for the country to moderate its regional policies in anticipation of the signing of a final nuclear agreement with the six global powers, which will change the strategic landscape of the Middle East. Iran is a major regional power and must now act responsibly to help stabilize the region. Yemen would be a good place to start. 

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A few of the google imagoes of 

Saudi-led destruction 

in Yemen 

in the past week:

 Humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen  UN A man walks on the rubble of a of a house destroyed by Saudi led airstrikes that killed a TV director, his wife, and three children in Sanaa, Yemen, on Wednesday, Feb. 10, 2016 AP Photo Hani Mohammed

Amidst the chaos of the conflict, women in Yemen have increased vulnerability to gender based violence

ASSOCIATED PRESS A young boy takes a photo of houses damaged in Saudi-led airstrikes A hospital run by Doctors Without Borders was also hit in the attack.

The U.S. based Blackwater Group has reportedly abandoned the Ta'iz front in western Yemen after suffering heavy casualties over the last two months while

Yemen, Forgotten War, Forgotten War Crimes US Cluster Munitions Used against Civilians

US, SIGN THE TEATY AGAINST CLUSTER BOMBS; do not ship more to the Saudi

This morning I sat on my back porch watching the sky turn from grey to palest blue.

Cool zephyrs ruffled the plant papaya leaves; all was quiet save for cooing of doves and the occasional hum of a plane high over-head.

I am not frightened by the hum of planes; the carry destruction for me, my spouse, my children, their children, my friends, my town.

It may be that another old man, in beautiful Yemen, also sat outside, watching the same sun light the mountains in Western Yemen.  It may be he also hears the hum of planes, and is sore afraid.

Planes overhead in Yemen carry death and destruction from Saudi Arabia -- next door -- and bombs from America, unimaginably far away.

This imagined old man doesn't know any Saud, has never harmed a Saud, once wished no harm on any Saud or American.  Before the Bombs came he wished only to be left alone.

Now he sits on the ground instead of on his back porch; there is only a whole where his porch, and wife, and children used to be.

The Saud King, His Son, and His Nephew, do not presently fear bombs.

The prince of counterterrorism: The story of Washington's favorite Saudi, Muhammad bin Nayef | Brookings Institution

They should.

Their indiscriminate funding of Salafi Jihadist warriors in Syria; their decades of funding madrases in Pakistan and Afghanistan; their funding of 9/11;

has attracted Ananke, 

Goddess of Fate and Necessity.

They tremble in fear of the the Islamic State, their own creation, which lusts to control Mecca and thus confirm its claim to be the Caliphate long predicted to rule Arabs; 

They tremble in fear of the Houthi, with whom they lived in peace until the bombs started dropping;

They tremble before their own people and the coming exhaustion of oil reserves, when the subsidies will stop;

They fear the US is a friend only so long as oil is needed (and well they should)

Meanwhile, my imagined old man is hungry, has been hungry for a long while, will be hungry for a long while longer, until he is no more.

Lost in the Stars, Kurt Weill

But I've been walking through the night, and the day

Till my eyes get weary and my head turns grey

And sometimes it seems maybe God's gone away

Forgetting the promise that we've heard him say

And we're lost out here in the stars.

FEBRUARY 14, 2016

two BLU-108 canisters, one with two skeet (submunitions) still attached, found in the al-Amar area of al-Safraa in Saada governorate, northern Yemen after an attack on April 27.
© 2015 Ole Solvang/Human Rights Watch

Yemen: Cluster Munitions Wounding Civilians

US Supplied Weapon Banned by 2008 Treaty

(Beirut) – The Saudi Arabia-led coalition is using internationally banned cluster munitions supplied by the United States in Yemen despite evidence of civilian casualties, Human Rights Watch said today. Recently transferred US-manufactured cluster munitions are being used in civilian areas contrary to US export requirements and also appear to be failing to meet the reliability standard required for US export of the weapons.

“Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners, as well as their US supplier, are blatantly disregarding the global standard that says cluster munitions should never be used under any circumstances,” said Steve Goose, arms director at Human Rights Watch and chair of the international Cluster Munition Coalition. “The Saudi-led coalition should investigate evidence that civilians are being harmed in these attacks and immediately stop using them.”

Since March 26, 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of nations has been conducting a military operation in Yemen against Houthi forces, also known as Ansar Allah. Field research by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the United Nations; interviews with witnesses and victims; and photographs and video evidence confirm that the Saudi-led coalition is using cluster munitions in Yemen.

Cluster munitions are delivered from the ground by artillery and rockets, or dropped from aircraft and contain multiple smaller submunitions that spread out over a wide area. A total of 118 countries have banned cluster munitions due to the threat they pose to nearby civilians at the time of attack and afterward. The submunitions often fail to explode and pose a threat until cleared and destroyed. Yemen, the US, and Saudi Arabia and its coalition members should join the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, Human Rights Watch said.

A BLU-108 canister with four skeet (submunitions) still attached found in the al-Amar areas of al-Safraa, Saada governorate, in northern Yemen after an attack on April 27.

 © 2015 Private

Human Rights Watch believes the Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states operating in Yemen is responsible for all or nearly all of these cluster munition attacks because it is the only entity operating aircraft or multibarrel rocket launchers capable of delivering five of the six types of cluster munitions that have been used in the conflict.

One type of air-dropped cluster munition used by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen is the CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon, manufactured by Textron Systems Corporation of Wilmington, Massachuetts. Human Rights Watch has investigated at least five attacks involving the use of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons in four governorates since March 2015.

Most recently, CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons were used in a December 12, 2015 attack on the Yemeni port town of Hodaida, injuring a woman and two children in their homes. At least two civilians were wounded when CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons were used near al-Amar village in Saada governorate on April 27, 2015, according to local residents and medical staff. More information on these and other cluster munition attacks is provided below.

While any use of any type of cluster munition should be condemned, there are two additional disturbing aspects to the use of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons in Yemen. First, US export law prohibits recipients of cluster munitions from using them in populated areas, as the Saudi coalition has clearly been doing. Second, US export law only allows the transfer of cluster munitions with a failure rate of less than 1 percent. But it appears that Sensor Fuzed Weapons used in Yemen are not functioning in ways that meet that reliability standard.

In recent years, the US has supplied these weapons to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), both of which possess attack aircraft of US and Western/NATO origin capable of delivering them. CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons are the only cluster munitions currently exported by the US, and the recipient must agree not to use them in civilian areas. According to the US government, CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons are the only cluster munition in its active inventory “that meet[s] our stringent requirements for unexploded ordnance rates,” with a claimed failure rate of less than 1 percent.

Distinctive fragmentation pattern on the road outside al-Amar in Saada governorate, northern Yemen, where BLU-108 canisters from a CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon attack on April 27 were found. 

© 2015 Ole Solvang/Human Rights Watch  

Human Rights Watch chairs the Cluster Munition Coalition U.S., which in a March 30, 2015 letter urged President Barack Obama to review the 2008 cluster munitions policy, and to remove the exception allowing cluster munitions that result in less than 1 percent unexploded ordnance rate.

According to a Textron Systems Corporation datasheet, the CBU-105 disperses 10 BLU-108 canisters that each release four submunitions the manufacturer calls “skeet” that are designed to sense, classify, and engage a target such as an armored vehicle. The submunitions explode above the ground and project an explosively formed jet of metal and fragmentation downward. The skeet are equipped with electronic self-destruct and self-deactivation features.

However, photographs taken by Human Rights Watch field investigators at one location and photographs received from another location show BLU-108 from separate attacks with their “skeets” or submunitions still attached. This shows a failure to function as intended as the submunitions failed to disperse from the canister, or were dispersed but did not explode.

“Sensor Fuzed Weapons are touted by some as the most high tech, reliable cluster munitions in the world, but we have evidence that they are not working the way they are supposed to in Yemen, and have harmed civilians in at least two attacks,” Goose said. “The evidence raises serious questions about compliance with US cluster munition policy and export rules.”

Evidence of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons Attacks in Yemen since March 2015

Al-Hayma Port, Hodaida governorate, December 12, 2015

The coalition has carried out intermittent air attacks on the military port of al-Hayma, 100 kilometers south of the western coastal city of Hodaida, beginning in September, four residents of the fishing village of al-Hayma, 1.5 kilometers from the port, told Human Rights Watch in late January 2016. Ammar Ismail, 22, said that the Yemeni coast guard and Houthi forces both occupy parts of the port, but local fisherman and gasoline smugglers are still using it as well.

Air strikes began at about 9 a.m. on December 12, said Muhammad Ahmad, 33, but about an hour later, he saw a different kind of weapon than used previously:

'I was with six friends from the village … sitting on a small hill watching the strikes. We suddenly saw about 20 white parachutes in the air, falling toward the port. Less than a minute later, each one released a cloud of black smoke as it neared the ground and exploded. It looked like a series of multiple bombs all next to each other. Less than 5 minutes later, it happened again, another bomb let out a group of about 20 parachutes and the same thing happened. But because of the direction the wind was blowing, the parachutes suddenly started falling toward our village.'

Hussein Saed, 42, said he watched four parachutes fall toward the village and “as each parachute came close to the ground, it would explode like fireworks, and release bombs.”

A FZU-39/B proximity sensor from CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon used in the attack on al-Hayma Port in Hodaida governorate on December 12, 2015© 2015 Private 

He said that one munition hit the wall of his brother Ali Saed’s home, breaking a window just below. Metal fragments flew into the room, wounding Ali Saed’s wife, Aziza Ahmad Ahdab, 42, and their daughter Salama, 4. Doctors had to amputate Ahdab’s lower right leg. Saed said that another munition landed in the yard of his other brother, Hassan Saed, and exploded next to the bathroom, but that no one was wounded.

A doctor at a local health clinic said that he treated Homadi Hassan Muliked, 15, who was wounded in his abdomen by another munition in the same attack. Muliked said that he quickly lay down on the floor in his house when he heard the explosions, but “suddenly I felt a pain in the lower right side of my abdomen. I looked down and saw blood. I didn’t know what happened or how, but later I saw the damage to our house. One of the bombs had hit our wall and exploded.”

One munition hit the home of Muhammad Zeid Ahmad, 50:

"Something hit the wall and broke through it. I immediately hit the floor. This strange object landed about five meters  from me. It looked like a small silver model of a rocket. I was very afraid, I tried to crawl away and escape because I knew it could explode at any moment. It looked very scary. But as I moved, it moved with me, not toward me, but in the same direction, in slow motion it seemed. … This went on for about a minute and then it exploded. Luckily I was not seriously wounded."

Another witness also said it seemed that a weapon followed him.  

While it is not possible for these weapons to detect human targets, the skeet, or submunitions, are released in all directions.

Remnants of a CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon (right) and a BLU-108 canister used in the attack on al-Hayma Port in Hodaida governorate on December 12, 2015.

© 2015 Private

Remnants of a CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon (right) and a BLU-108 canister used in the attack on al-Hayma Port in Hodaida governorate on December 12, 2015.

Amran governorate, June 29, 2015

According to a report by Amnesty International, CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons were used in an attack on Harf Sofian in Amran governorate, south of Saada, that locals said occurred on June 29. Amnesty International researchers visiting the area on July 6 found and photographed the remnants of an empty BLU-108 canister.

Sanhan, Sanaa governorate, May 21, 2015

Human Rights Watch received photographs and collected witness accounts that indicate CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons were used in an attack on the Affash Historic Fort in Sanhan, Sanaa governorate, about 20 kilometers south of Sanaa City, on May 21.

The fort is in the village of Bait al-Ahmar, which has approximately 460 inhabitants, where former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, a key supporter of the Houthis in the current conflict, owns a house. A guard at the fort, Nagi Abdullah al-Gahshi, said that the closest military base is 20 to 25 kilometers away, at Raymet Humaid military camp.

Ali Mohsen Maqula, a guard for the past four years at the Affash Historic Fort’s housing compound and member of the Republican Guard, told Human Rights Watch that he witnessed a cluster munition attack. Yemen’s Republican Guard is a military unit that was commanded by former President Saleh’s son, Ahmed Ali Saleh.

Maqula said he was on a hill a kilometer from the fort at about 7 p.m. on May 21, when he saw a series of about 12 explosions. “I remember the explosions in the sky, they looked like big bright red fireworks, the color of lava,” he said. It was too dark to see anything else, he said. He said that 10 guards at the compound were wounded in the attack, but that Saleh was not there at the time.

A BLU-108 canister with all four skeet (submunitions) still attached, reportedly used in an attack on the Affash Historic Fort in Sanhan, Sanaa governorate, on May 21.

© 2015 Private

Maqula left but returned to the village a week later and saw the remnants in the compound of BLU-108 canisters with their parachutes still attached, as well as at least 20 unexploded skeet, or submunitions. Two weeks later, a team of military engineers arrived and destroyed the submunitions near the gate of the compound by detonating them, but did not touch the rest, he said.

In September 2015, Abdullah Abu Hurriya, a politician from former President Saleh’s General People’s Congress Party, hired Muhammad Ahmad al-Nahmi, a freelance photographer, to photograph the submunitions. Al-Nahmi told Human Rights Watch that he traveled to the village and saw at least eight BLU-108 canisters in the fort, and another three next to the compound’s mosque. Abu Hurriya provided copies of the photos to Human Rights Watch that show the remnants of a CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon, including a BLU-108 canister with all four skeets or submunitions still attached, indicated it failed to function.

Maqula said that the local sheikh of the village, Muhammad Mohsen, warned residents to leave on May 19 after three bombs – not cluster munitions – hit the compound at around 11:30 a.m., wounding al-Gahshi and three other guards. Maqula said that those who lived closest to the compound walls left, but about 200 residents living 500 meters or further from the compound stayed. He said that after the May 21 attack, the remaining civilians fled. Since then, there have been four more attacks on the compound – one in September and three in October – but none with cluster munitions.

Al-Amar, Saada governorate, April 27, 2015

A Sanaa-based activist provided Human Rights Watch with photographs that he said were taken by a resident of Saada governorate at the site of an April 27 airstrike by the Saudi-led coalition in the al-Amar area of al-Safraa, 35 kilometers south of the northern Houthi stronghold of Saada city. The photographs show a BLU-108 canister with four skeet, or submunitions, still attached, indicating it failed to function, and another empty BLU-108.

An FZU-39/B proximity sensor, which opens CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon in mid-air, reportedly used in an attack on the Affash Historic Fort in Sanhan, Sanaa governorate, on May 21. 

© 2015 Private

Local residents and medical staff said the CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons used outside al-Amar village on April 27, wounded two or three people. One witness said that one of the wounded was a fighter while others, including medical staff in two hospitals, said that at least two were civilians.

In May, locals showed Human Rights Watch the remnants of two BLU-108 canisters and the place where they were found by near the main road between Sanaa and Saada, about 100 meters south of al-Amar. One canister still contained a submunition, while the other was empty. Human Rights Watch found a third empty canister in bushes nearby. Researchers identified six small craters in the asphalt at the attack site that are consistent with craters created by the explosive submunitions released from BLU-108 canisters.

Ayid Muhammad Haydar, 37, a resident, said that he heard an airplane overhead around 11 a.m. on a Monday, the weekly village market day, in late April. He said that the sky filled with about 40 parachutes. He did not hear any explosions in the air, but said that he heard about 15 small explosions that sounded like hand grenades over the next two hours.

Local residents said that Saudi-led coalition aircraft had carried out dozens of aerial attacks on April 27, apparently targeting the al-Safra military complex, housing the 72nd Military Brigade, two to three kilometers away, which Al-Amar residents described as the closest military installation to their village.

An expended BLU-108 canister from a CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon found in the al-Amar area of al-Safraa, Saada governorate, in northern Yemen on April 27. 

© 2015 Ole Solvang/Human Rights Watch

Al-Shaaf, Saada governorate, April 17, 2015

A video uploaded to YouTube on April 17 by the pro-Houthi September 21 YouTube channel shows numerous objects with parachutes slowly descending from the sky. The video zooms out to show a mid-air detonation and several black smoke clouds from other detonations. Human Rights Watch established the location, using satellite imagery analysis, as al-Shaaf in Saqeen, in the western part of Saada governorate. The munitions appeared to land on a cultivated plateau, within 600 meters of several dozen buildings in four to six village clusters.

US Transfer of the Weapons

The US Department of Defense concluded a contract with Textron Defense Systems for the manufacture of 1,300 CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons for Saudi Arabia in August 2013. The contract stipulated that the weapons were to be delivered by December 2015, but Human Rights Watch has not been able to determine if all cluster munitions have been delivered. The UAE received an unknown number of CBU-105 from Textron Defense Systems in June 2010, fulfilling a contract announced in November 2007. At the time that these two nations procured these weapons, each CBU-105 cost approximately $360,000.

Under a June 2008 policy directive issued by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the US can only export cluster munitions that “after arming do not result in more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments,” and the receiving country must agree that cluster munitions “will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.”

This policy is most recently codified in Section 7054 (b) of the Consolidated and Continuing Appropriations Act (H.R. 83) of 2015. According to guidance issued by the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency in 2011, “the only cluster munition with a compliant submunition compliant with the reliability standard established by the Gates Policy is the CBU-97B/CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon.”

There is no evidence to indicate that CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons have been transferred to or stockpiled by the other countries participating in the Saudi-led coalition – Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, and Sudan.

Parachute from a BLU-108 canister used in the CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon attack on al-Hayma Port in Hodaida governorate on December 12, 2015.

© 2015 Private

Saudi Arabia has denied using other types of cluster munitions in Yemen, but it has admitted to using CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons. In a January 11, 2016 interview with CNN, the Saudi military spokesperson said the coalition used CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons once, in Hajjah in April 2015, “but not indiscriminately.” He said that the CBU-105 has been used “against vehicles.”

The Saudi-led coalition may have used CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons in Hajjah in an attack on a vehicle on a mountain road between Amran and Hajjah city. In August 2015, several locals in the area told Human Rights Watch researchers that they had heard about a military truck with a family inside being hit by cluster munitions sometime between May and July. A local news outlet reported an incident meeting the same description on May 21.

While the CBU-105 is banned under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, its use is permitted under existing US policy and its export is permitted under the existing US export restrictions on cluster munitions.

The US has made few public statements in response to the use of cluster munitions in Yemen. According to State Department officials, the US is aware of “reports” of the “alleged” use of cluster munitions by the Saudi-led coalition. In an August 19 article, however, an unnamed Pentagon official was quoted as acknowledging that “the U.S. is aware that Saudi Arabia has used cluster munitions in Yemen.”

In July, US Representative Jim McGovern raised concern about the use of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons in Yemen, stating: “If we have evidence that countries are not complying with US law that ought to be enough to say we sell these weapons to them no more. Period. End of story.” McGovern said the US should join the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Fishing boats burn in al-Hayma Port in Hodaida governorate after the December 12 attack in which CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons were used.

© 2015 Private 

Before the Yemen conflict, the only known use of the Sensor Fuzed Weapon was by the US in Iraq in 2003, apparently on a very limited scale, but multiple failures called into question the claimed reliability rate of better than 99 pecent.

In addition to the recent transfer of CBU-105, the US provided Saudi Arabia with significant exports of cluster bombs between 1970 and 1999. There is credible evidence that in November 2009, Saudi Arabia dropped cluster bombs in Yemen’s northern Saada governorate during fighting between the Houthis and the Yemeni and Saudi militaries.