This Times article should have been written by H. L.Mencken after reading a Kafka novel:
1) The "president" of Yemen was installed, not elected; he was run out of the country because he was unacceptable to those who held power in that country; he fled to Saudi Arabia and resigned his presidency; at Saudi Arabia's demand he withdreew his withdrawal, and now command a portion of the port city of Aden, but only because of Saudi Arabia's naval and air support.
2) . The "president" condemns the United States for killing civilians, and his patron, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is killing thousands of civilians, and starving millions of them with its naval blockade. "Finally, Sir, have you no shame?"
3) And the final kicker: the "president" withdraws permission for United States' ground operations, which he ha no power to prevent, because the Trumpists listed Yemen as a "terrorist" country. Utterly pointless.
Ah well. But it does illustrate how poorly Tuumpists are educated in the realities of even so poor a country as Yemen. Until they get up tospeed, it is better, after all, to leave Syria to Russian "kindless."
Read the article. Think of Menchen. Wish he were still with us.
Yemen Withdraws Permission for U.S. Antiterror Ground Missions
Photo
Women walk past graffiti denouncing strikes by U.S. drones, in Sanaa, Yemen.CreditKhaled Abdullah/Reuters
WASHINGTON — Angry at the civilian casualties incurred last month in the first commando raid authorized by President Trump, Yemen has withdrawn permission for the United States to run Special Operations ground missions against suspected terrorist groups in the country, according to American officials.
Grisly photographs of children apparently killed in the crossfire of a 50-minute firefight during the raid caused outrage in Yemen. A member of the Navy’s SEAL Team 6, Chief Petty Officer William Owens, was also killed in the operation.
While the White House continues to insist that the attack was a “success” — a characterization it repeated on Tuesday — the suspension of commando operations is a setback for Mr. Trump, who has made it clear he plans to take a far more aggressive approach against Islamic militants.
It also calls into question whether the Pentagon will receive permission from the president for far more autonomy in selecting and executing its counterterrorism missions in Yemen, which it sought, unsuccessfully, from President Barack Obama in the last months of his term.
Mr. Obama deferred the decision to Mr. Trump, who appeared inclined to grant it: His approval of the Jan. 29 raid came over a dinner four nights earlier with his top national security aides, rather than in the kind of rigorous review in the Situation Room that became fairly routine under President George W. Bush and Mr. Obama.
The raid, in which just about everything went wrong, was an early test of Mr. Trump’s national security decision-making — and his willingness to rely on the assurances of his military advisers. His aides say that even though the decision was made over a dinner, it had been fully vetted, and had the requisite legal approvals.
Mr. Trump will soon have to make a decision about the more general request by the Pentagon to allow more of such operations in Yemen without detailed, and often time-consuming, White House review. It is unclear whether Mr. Trump will allow that, or how the series of mishaps that marked his first approval of such an operation may have altered his thinking about the human and political risks of similar operations.
The Pentagon has said that the main objective of the raid was to recover laptop computers, cellphones and other information that could help fill gaps in its understanding of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, whose leaders have tried to carry out at least three attacks on the United States. But it is unclear whether the information the commandos recovered will prove valuable.
The White House continued its defense of the raid on Tuesday, making no reference to the Yemeni reaction.
Neither the White House nor the Yemenis have publicly announced the suspension. Pentagon spokesmen declined to comment, but other military and civilian officials confirmed that Yemen’s reaction had been strong.Sean Spicer, the White House press secretary, denied reports that the purpose of the attack was to capture or kill any specific Qaeda leader. “The raid that was conducted in Yemen was an intelligence-gathering raid,” he said. “That’s what it was. It was highly successful. It achieved the purpose it was going to get, save the loss of life that we suffered and the injuries that occurred.”
It was unclear if Yemen’s decision to halt the ground attacks was also influenced by Mr. Trump’s inclusion of the country on his list of nations from which he wants to temporarily suspend all immigration, an executive order that is now being challenged in the federal courts.
According to American civilian and military officials, the Yemeni ban on operations does not extend to military drone attacks, and does not affect the handful of American military advisers who are providing intelligence support to the Yemenis and forces from the United Arab Emirates.
In 2014, Yemen’s government temporarily halted those drones from flying because of botched operations that also killed civilians. But later they quietly resumed, and in recent years they have been increasing in frequency, a sign of the fact that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, is considered one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist groups.
The raid stirred immediate outrage among Yemeni government officials, some of whom accused the Trump administration of not fully consulting with them before the mission. Within 24 hours of the assault on a cluster of houses in a tiny village in mountainous central Yemen, the country’s foreign minister, Abdul Malik Al Mekhlafi, condemned the raid in a post on his official Twitter account as “extrajudicial killings.”
In an interview with Al Jazeera this week, Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, Yemen’s ambassador to the United States, said that President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi raised concerns about the raid in a meeting with the American ambassador to Yemen in Riyadh on Feb. 2.
“Yemen’s government is a key partner in the war against terrorism,” Mr. Mubarak said in the interview, adding that Yemen’s cooperation should not come “at the expense of the Yemeni citizens and the country’s sovereignty.”
The Pentagon has acknowledged that the raid killed several civilians, including children, and is investigating. The dead include, by the account of relatives, the 8-year-old daughter of Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born Qaeda leader who was killed in a targeted drone strike in 2011.American counterterrorism officials have expressed growing fears about their lack of understanding of Qaeda operations in Yemen since the United States was forced to withdraw the last 125 Special Operations advisers from the country in March 2015 after Houthi rebels ousted the government of President Hadi, the Americans’ main counterterrorism partner.
The Pentagon has tried to start rebuilding its counterterrorism operations in Yemen since then. Last May, American Special Operations forces helped Yemeni and Emirati troops evict Qaeda fighters from the port city of Al Mukalla.
Al Qaeda had used Al Mukalla as a base as the militants stormed through southern Yemen, capitalizing on the power vacuum caused by the country’s 14-month civil war and seizing territory, weapons and money.
The deadly raid last month, launched from an amphibious assault ship off the Yemeni coast, was the first known American-led ground mission in Yemen since December 2014, when members of SEAL Team 6 stormed a village in southern Yemen in an effort to free an American photojournalist held hostage by Al Qaeda. But the raid ended with the kidnappers killing the journalist and a South African held with him.
The United States conducted 38 drone strikes in Yemen last year, up from 23 in 2014, and has already carried out five strikes so far this year, according to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Long War Journal.
In response to the raid, Al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen urged followers last weekend to attack the United States and its allies in the country.
Qasim al-Raymi, the leader of the Qaeda offshoot, likened his fighters to extremists battling American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to a speech translated by SITE Intelligence Group, which tracks extremist activities and messaging.
Specialists in Yemeni culture and politics have cautioned that Al Qaeda would seize on the raid to whip up anti-American feelings and attract more followers.
“The use of U.S. soldiers, high civilian casualties and disregard for local tribal and political dynamics,” the Brussels-based International Crisis Group said in a report released last Thursday, “plays into AQAP’s narrative of defending Muslims against the West and could increase anti-U.S. sentiment and with it AQAP’s pool of recruits.”
Senate Majority Leader Addison Mitchell McConnell is leading the charge to punish Russia for the crime of attempting a regime change in the United State by meddling in its recent election for president.
Addison is old enough to remember the United States involvement in changing regimes in many countries, especially since the end of WWII. Wikipedia has the history detailed. See United States involvement nregime change.
A wikipedia summary is this:
United States involvement in regime change has entailed both overt and covert actions aimed at altering, replacing, or preserving foreign governments. In the latter half of the 19th century, the U.S. government undertook regime change actions mainly in Latin America and the southwest Pacific, and included the Mexican-American, Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars. At the onset of the 20th century the United States shaped or installed friendly governments in many countries including Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. government expanded the geographic scope of its regime change actions, as the country struggled with the Soviet Union for global leadership and influence within the context of the Cold War. Significant involvements included the 1950 Korean War, the 1953 Iranian coup d'état, the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion targeting Cuba, the Vietnam War, and support for the Argentinian Dirty War, but included other operations throughout the world.
The cited article goes into great and interesting detail about all the US regime change activities, some still on-going. Read especially about US and Britain's activity in Iran, for that activity has important present consequences for Syria and for US relations with Russia.
In the curious world of the US congress (and in all the world’s deliberative bodies), what We do is good; what They do is bad. And these deliberative bodies are supposed to prevent the Bomb from Destroying All Life on the Planet (except for some germs, who are the most successful life form of all). Good luck to all of us.
Obama's support for the Saudi Arabian genocide in Yemen is nicely balanced by his support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, known as the YPG.
Syrian Kurds are the only democratic ,non-sectarian, feminist organized group in the Middle East and deserve full-throated support from all nations, including Germany, France, Great Britain, Russia, and China.
None should not be shy about throwing their support behind he YPG, challenging Erdoğan and his Turkish dictatorship, as Obama is doing. (The Gulf Cooperation Council will also be challenged, as it should be.)
Here's hoping Obama succeeds in Syria and manages to humanize Saudi Arabia as he appears to be slowly trying to do. To slowly for my taste.
The Washington Post article is clear and helpful in understanding Syria and its future. Highly recommended
‘We’re not in perfect control’: U.S. plans operation against Islamic State in Syria despite obstacles
A member of Syrian Democratic Forces surveys the town of Manbij, Syria, on Sept. 25. After pushing the Islamic State out of Manbij in August, the U.S.-backed group will turn its attention to nearby Raqqa. (Ayham Al-Mohammad/AFP/Getty Images)
By Missy Ryan and Karen DeYoung October 31 at 7:48 PM
The Obama administration is racing to settle questions that could scuttle a planned offensive against the Islamic State in the Syrian city of Raqqa that Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter has said will begin “within weeks . . . and not many weeks.”
Senior administration officials have attributed the newly described urgency to Raqqa’s symbolic role as the “capital of the caliphate” claimed by the militants and intelligence indicating that it is the center of Islamic State planning for terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States.
But the officials acknowledged a wealth of problems that could derail the offensive, including the need to gather and train additional Syrian forces. More ominously, they cite the explosive dynamics between two allies: Turkey and Syrian Kurdish fighters, who form the bulk of the existing offensive force.
“This is one of the situations in which we have contacts and influence over all the actors. But we’re not in perfect control,” said one of several officials who discussed the operation on the condition of anonymity to speak candidly about its planning and potential pitfalls.
The uneasy mix of forces battling the Islamic State VIEW GRAPHIC
President Obama approved the Raqqa plan in meetings with top national security aides in early October. But concerns about unresolved problems have put off initial hopes that the offensive could take place simultaneously with a major operation to retake the Iraqi city of Mosul that began two weeks ago.
Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend, the U.S. commander of the anti-Islamic State coalition, described the current Raqqa plan as “overlapping” the Mosul offensive. “We want to pressure Raqqa” so that militants escaping Mosul do not “have a convenient place to go,” Townsend said last week, after Carter’s description of the timing during a news conference at NATO.
The Pentagon, at least temporarily, has withdrawn a controversial request to provide direct arms shipments to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, known as the YPG, which forms the bulk of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces slated to undertake the Raqqa offensive. Consideration of the weapons was deferred, officials said, because initial plans to encircle the city by taking control of surrounding villages and access routes would not require additional weaponry and because conflicts with Turkey remain unresolved.
Turkey, a NATO ally and part of the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State, considers the YPG a terrorist force, allied with Turkey’s own Kurdish separatist movement. Its concern has grown as the Syrian Kurds, with strong U.S. backing, have taken control of much of the Syria-Turkey border from the militants.
In August, after the YPG-
dominated Syrian Democratic Forces pushed the Islamic State from the city of Manbij, northwest of Raqqa, Turkey struck back with a cross-border air and ground offensive against the Kurds.
Since then, Turkish troops and a force of about 1,000 Arab fighters from the separate Free Syrian Army have occupied a 15-mile-deep stretch along the border inside Syria. The Turkish goal is to create a 5,000-square-mile area free of the Islamic State and the Kurds, including the northwestern cities of al-Bab, Azaz and Jarabulus, U.S. officials said.
In a statement Thursday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that once his forces take Islamic State-held al-Bab, the plan is to move onward to Raqqa.
Erdogan said Thursday that he had urged Obama in a telephone call the night before not to involve the YPG in a Raqqa offensive. “We shared our plans with him,” Erdogan said in public remarks. “We said, ‘Come, let’s kick Daesh out of Raqqa together.’ ” Daesh and ISIL are alternate terms for the Islamic State.
Administration officials described the call differently. Obama, they said, told Erdogan in no uncertain terms that the decision had been made to launch the initial phase of the offensive to isolate Raqqa, using the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as the only force capable of succeeding. The United States would work to control the Kurds, but Turkey needed to support the coalition-backed operation or stay out of the way.
Townsend emphasized the same point in a Thursday news conference. Turkey’s fight against the Kurdish forces, he said, was “not helpful for the coalition. And we ask members of the coalition to refrain from undertaking activities that are not focused on the defeat of Daesh.”
As far as Turkey joining the Raqqa offensive, Townsend said, “We’ll welcome any contributing nation that wants to make themselves part of the coalition.” But, he said, “that can’t just come with a whole bunch of strings. They’ve got to be willing to do what the coalition needs done.”
“The threat to the Raqqa campaign is less that [Turkish-backed forces] . . . race to Raqqa ahead of the SDF,” a senior official said. “What could derail it is if there’s a huge dust-up between Arabs and Kurds . . . potentially around al-Bab that creates a huge sucking sound” and drains both fighters and focus from the Raqqa offensive.
To further complicate the situation, the potential explosion in and around al-Bab is within shooting distance of Aleppo, where Syria’s civil war is raging between rebels and government forces and their Russian and Iranian allies. “A lot of forces could collide,” the official said.
The operation to encircle Raqqa is expected to take about a month, the official said. “The next phase is tightening the noose,” and then “you’ll see thousands of people moving south” toward the city.
Officials said the SDF numbers about 50,000 fighters, mostly Kurds but including about 10,000 Arabs, Turkmens and Christians.
Planners anticipate that as many as 10,000 militants may be massed inside Raqqa by then, requiring an offensive force at least that big. At that point, officials said, the request to arm the SDF — including with antitank weapons and earthmoving equipment to break militant defenses — is likely to be back on the table.
A small force of U.S. Special Operations personnel has been operating alongside the Kurdish-led force for months and has assessed it to be sufficient for an assault on Raqqa. The hands-on U.S. support, the official said, “helps us keep them focused.”
Military officials also appear confident that coalition air and artillery attacks will give that relatively small force a decisive edge against the militants.
Turkey is not alone in expressing concerns, however.
Jennifer Cafarella, a scholar at the Institute for the Study of War, said the United States would need a relatively larger, more effective partner in Raqqa than it has in Mosul — where the coalition is aiding a massive Iraqi military force — because its support capacity is much smaller in Syria.
Others have also questioned whether U.S. reliance on Kurdish-dominated forces to liberate an ethnically Arab city could create new conflicts and play into jihadist propaganda.
A key element of the U.S. plan is the expectation that Kurdish forces would spearhead the early stages of the operation, capturing and holding towns around Raqqa, and other SDF fighters would lead the assault into the Arab city to avoid inflaming the ethnic tensions that have characterized recent Kurdish advances.
But similar plans have run into difficulties elsewhere, including in Manbij, where Kurdish forces remained — despite U.S. promises that they would leave once the city was captured — and then began to head north toward the Turkish border.
The prospect of expanded weaponry could provide a powerful incentive for the YPG to move toward Raqqa, even as it pursues its larger goal of securing greater territory and political power across Syria. U.S. officials have warned the Kurds that they won’t get continued military assistance if they act against American interests by confronting the Turks.
Nasir Haj Mansour, an adviser to the SDF leadership, said Kurdish priorities could be reconciled with the American objective of retaking Raqqa. YPG forces will take part in the operation, he said, “but the level and the nature of the involvement hasn’t been defined yet.”
Although there are far fewer civilians in Raqqa than the estimated 1.5 million in Mosul, concerns have also been voiced about planning for what happens there after the Islamic State is ejected.
“There’s a choice here that the American administration has to make, between doing this expeditiously and doing this right, in a way that is sustainable,” said Robert Ford, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria who is now a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute.
Adam Entous in Washington and Zakaria Zakaria in Istanbul contributed to this report.
Kurds [who are the most effective fighting force opposing the Islamic State and who have been excluded from the Geneva please talks] should be included in the intra-Syrian peace talks in Geneva, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov said on Friday.
• • •
“Some members [of the ISSG] exert strong pressure, because they consider the PYD to be terrorists’ supporters or an unnecessary element, as Kurdish representatives from other political groups [Kurdish National Council] are taking part in the Geneva talks,” he said.
• • •
Although Russian-Turkish relations have drastically improved after the failed military coup on July 15, Russia did not change its stance towards the Syrian Kurdish forces that have been the most effective element against ISIS.
According to Akhmetov, there are several reasons Russia is still supporting the Kurds despite of Moscow’s new relations with Turkey.
“First to not lose their support completely, and secondly to not provoke them to make any reckless steps like announcing secession from Syria,” he said.
__________
The United States has taken contradictory positions on the YPG's joining the peace talks. It formally opposes participation, out of deference to Turkey; and it funds YPG's fighters is Syria, over fierce Turkish objection. Erdoğan's government does not currently deserve international recognition, because of gross human rights violatio ns. Saudi Arabia's dream of a Wahhabi state in Syria is a pipe dream -- to Syrians, it and to most people it is a nightmare.
The United States should join Russia in supporting the YPG's inclusion in the Geneva peace talks.
For those of you who are interested in the long-oppressed, now free and ultra-democratic Syrian Kurds: the view of the cease-fire initiative from Iraqi Kurdistan.
US: Syrian truce applies to Turks, Kurds
Kurdish fighters from the People's Protection Units (YPG) walk in the Ghwairan neighborhood of Hasaka, Syria, Aug. 22, 2016. (Photo: Reuters/Rodi Said)
ERBIL, Kurdistan Region (Kurdistan24) – The United States Department of State said the Russo-American ceasefire plan for Syria that began at sundown on Monday applies to Kurdish forces and the Turkish army.
The US State Department Spokesperson John Kirby made the comments in a Washington daily press briefing shortly after the Syrian ceasefire – or “the cessation of hostilities” as dubbed by American officials – came into effect.
“We don’t want to see violence or clashes between Turkish forces and Kurdish forces,” said Kirby according to an online transcript of the briefing received by Kurdistan24.
“What we’ve said, and I’ll say it again today, is that we want them, as members of the counter-Da’esh coalition, to fight Da’esh, that that’s where their – we want their energies to be applied,” he added, using the Arabic abbreviaion for the Islamic State (IS).
Sporadic clashes have taken place between Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the Turkish Army.
In late August, the Turkish Army entered the town of Jarabulus to obstruct Kurdish territorial expansion in northern Syria and fend off IS from its southern border.
Turkey is supporting the Free Syrian Army (FSA) units and “moderate” Islamist groups on the ground and from the air in its incursion into a 90-kilometer corridor that stands between the Kurdish cantons of Kobani and Afrin.
The US-backed YPG and its multi-ethnic surrogate alliance of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) already announced they would abide by the ceasefire.
They added they would refrain from offensive operations against all the warring factions except for IS and al-Qaeda affiliates.
Meanwhile, Russia’s Defense Ministry called on the Turkish-supported FSA to stop fighting Kurdish units in the run-up to the truce in Syria, according to international news agency Reuters.
Here is a rational, objective view of the Russian and United States success an joint objectives in Syria.
In short, both want free, fair elections. Agreement ends there.
Two of the United States' allies, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, want the outcome to be a repressiveWahhabist government or at least one supposed by Salafi Jihadists; another United States' ally, Qatar, supports the Muslim Brotherhood (also supported by Turkey) but Qatar's primary objective is an oil pipeline through Syria that can deliverer it's natural gas from the Pas field to Europe.
Iran wants the election of a government favorable to it --as the Assad regime is -- and one which will allow the already-planned oil pipeline from its interest in the Pars Field to Europe.
Russia's interest is negative; it does not want the Qatar pipeline to be built because it's natural gas to Europewould compete with its own sales to europe; and it does not want a Muslim jihadist government in Syria -- it has already too many Jihadists in Russian republics as it is. The Assad regime is acceptable to Russia and Russia is no weed to Assad's remaining in power.
The Kurdish objectives are straight-forward easy to state difficult to obtain. Kurds living in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran were promised an independent Kurdistan after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by the Great Powers in World War I. With no advance warning Kurds were arbitrarily assigned to Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria by Great Britain and France. See Kurdistan in Seven Maps:
Kurds were badly treated by host countries except Iran. Kurds want an independent Kurdistan that includes Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Turkey violently and unwisely objets. And now, because of the battlefield success of Syrian Kurds in northern Syria and the Peshmerga in Iraq, where they re helped by he United State, they want the nation to include access to the Mediterranean Sea.
The United States has no stated territorial objectives and none is apparent. It will want to assist the oil interests in the United States and Great Britain but those interests are not apparently at stake in Syria. The United States' stated objective is to defeat the Islamic State and other Jihadists in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, who carry out attacks on the United States and the European Union (and also in Pakistan). I think the United States wants to keep a military presence in Afghanistan and in Iraq or Syria, but it has stated no such objective.
Men store bags of flour unloaded from a Red Crescent aid convoy in the rebel-held besieged town of 0, in the eastern Damascus suburb of Ghouta, March 7, 2016. The cessation in hostilities in Syria has produced the first significant flow of humanitarian assistance in several years. (photo by REUTERS/Bassam Khabieh)
Kerry notes 'beneficial reduction' in Syrian violence
United States, Russia on right course in Syria
March 27, 2016
On March 27, the cessation of hostilities in Syria will have held for one month. Yes, there have been violations, but the agreement has held. Given where we were, and where we are, we might put the present state of affairs in the category of a small miracle, a breakthrough for US-Russian leadership and cooperation and, hopefully, a turning point for the Syrian people.
US Secretary of State John Kerry said in Moscow on March 24, “There has been a fragile but nevertheless beneficial reduction in violence — some say as much as 85-90% — in Syria. It’s also true that the cessation in hostilities has produced the first significant flow of humanitarian assistance to people, some whom haven’t seen that assistance in several years. But we both know that more needs to be done in terms of both a reduction of violence and the flow of humanitarian aid.”
There is of course much more to be done, and if the cessation of hostilities continues to hold and expand, it will be the result of a deep and impactful partnership between Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Kerry said March 24 that the United States and Russia have agreed to press for expanded humanitarian assistance, the release of detainees and an acceleration of the political process leading to a transition government, a new constitution and elections. The same day, UN Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura said that both the Syrian government and the opposition delegations had taken the first round of negotiations “very seriously.” Talks are expected to resume in April.
And let’s add a bit more good news: The Islamic State (IS) is losing ground in Syria and Iraq. IHS/Jane’s reported March 15 that IS has lost 22% of its territory in both countries, mostly in Syria, since January 2015, a trend that accelerated with the Russian military intervention on behalf of the Syrian government in September. US Special Operations Forces killed top IS financier Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli last week, and as this column goes to press, Syrian government forces, backed by Russian air power, are poised to retake Palmyra from the terrorist group.
As IS loses ground in Syria and Iraq, its fighters are already seeking new territories, especially in Libya, and new targets, including in Europe, as evidenced by the deadly terrorist attacks in Brussels on March 22, which claimed 31 lives.
Maxim Suchkov wrote, “Putin now holds an important position for the shaping of a political transition in Syria. Russia acquired the air base in Khmeimim [or Hmaimim], which it did not have before. Its geopolitical standing is secured as a power broker in the Middle East, while its weapons are in great demand across the region. The global outreach is incredibly important as well. Some would even argue it was central to the idea of the operation from the very beginning. In addition, Russia showcased its military might, sending signals to those who might have been tempted to put it to the test. Russia also excelled on the public relations side of the art of modern war. Detailed daily reports from the Defense Ministry, accompanied by high-definition maps and video footage, prevented opponents from manipulating its campaign results in the media. Even if Moscow doesn’t save [Bashar al-] Assad’s presidency, his departure will be a negotiated event, not forced, an important element for Putin personally and for Russia’s vision of its role in contemporary international affairs.”
Ali Hashem, speaking with official Syrian and Iranian sources, confirmed that “when Russia decided it was time to withdraw the major part of its forces from Syria, the announcement, on March 14, came as no surprise to its allies in the Syrian civil war. The Syrian government, Iran and Hezbollah had been informed in advance.”
This column appreciates the complexity and fragility of the Syrian peace process, and the long game against IS and al-Qaeda, but we admit to being cautious optimists. The Obama administration is on the right track in Syria, with admittedly a long way to go. In our very first column, in December 2012, we identified the role of Russia as one of “four trends that might signal if and when there is an endgame in Syria — and what that endgame would be.” The Russian trend is indeed shaping the Syrian endgame, and the United States is right to work with it. Russia’s interests in Syria are not a perfect match for the United States, but neither are the interests of America’s traditional allies in the region. While some may understandably second-guess Russian intentions, and rightly criticize its at times indiscriminate bombing campaign in support of Syrian government forces, as this column has done, it might also be useful to create a scorecard or tally comparing Russia’s record with those of other regional powers in both seeking a peaceful end to the conflict and undertaking direct attacks on IS and Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria. Our back-of-the-envelope calculation is the Russian score on these counts would probably fare well compared to US regional allies. The attacks in Brussels last week reveal the stakes in Syria are linked to a struggle against IS, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. In Syria, as in the broader international battle against terrorism, the United States and Europe are well-served by collaboration, rather than confrontation, with Russia.
Barzani promises crackdown on corruption
Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, told Amberin Zaman in an exclusive interview for Al-Monitor that the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) are “exactly one and the same thing,” and that the United States turns a “blind eye” because of the priority to fight IS.
In regard to the referendum on independence for the Kurdistan Region, Barzani said “with utter conviction that, barring circumstances beyond our control, that yes, we are trying to do it this year. … I think it will be before October.” He said that the wording of the referendum question, or questions, are still being worked out, and that “we are talking to Baghdad, we will talk to Iran at the same time that we talk to Turkey. We want to do it [transition to independence] in a peaceful and balanced way.”
Barzani acknowledged popular discontent with a lack of transparency in Kurdistan Regional Government energy deals and promised “to fight corruption and to fight those people who exploited their government position for oil contracts, sales of agricultural land and things like that. Whoever will be responsible from the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Peshmerga, prime minister, any minister, any leader of the party, any security official — they all must be held responsible for what they have done.”
There is another oil issue in Central Asia which is causing as much difficulty for Turkey as Syria is. Azerbaijan is building a pipeline from its oil fields to Italy,, which would thwart Russia's position as the dominant supplier of oil to Europe.
Russia is said to have entered the Syrian conflict to stop Qatar from exporting natural gas from the Pars Field to Europe through Syria.
(Iran wants to export natural gas from the Pars field through Pakistan to India and China, so far blacked by the United States' threat of sanctions and its threat of withholding military aid to Pakistan, important to Pakistan because it perceives India as a mortal enemy.)
TheTANAP pipeline is a serious that to Russia, though not as serious as a Qatari pipeline would be, because Azerbaijan doesn't have reserves as large as the Pars field, which is the largest in the World.
But TANAP would cut into Russia's oil sales to Europe and Russia can ill afford the loss.
So Russia and he PKK, which is cutting Turkey,s oil lines, become natural allies. The United States is handed an opportunity to resolve the Ukraine dispute with Russia by siding with Russia and the PKK.
If, then, Turkey is "left with no friends but Saudi Arabia, Qatar and arguably Israel", as the al Monitor article, below, suggests, will the United State continue to support Syrian Kurds in their valiant war against the Islamic State, or will it yield to Saudi pressure, and side with Turkey?
What is important is the Kurdish determination to have their own nation, with access to the Sea. That determination will decide the outcome. The United States should continue to side with the Kurds, even after the Islamic State is defeated, and Israel should abandon the Turks or be even further isolated from the international community.
The Kurdistan Workers Party released a video on its official website Aug. 29, 2015, showing an attack on the Shah Deniz pipeline that transports natural gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey. (photo by YOUTUBE/GlobalTVz)
How the PKK is entering energy wars
The Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), denounced as a terrorist group by Turkey, last month inaugurated its first representative office abroad — in Moscow. A Kurdish speaker at the ceremony hailed the event as “a historic moment for the Kurdish people” before lauding his hosts: “Russia is a big power and a prominent actor in the Middle East. In fact, it’s not only an actor, but also a scriptwriter.”
The PYD is an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which sits even higher on Turkey's blacklist. Portraits of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan adorn the walls of the PYD office in Moscow, suggesting Turkey’s accusations are not baseless. Yet Russia clearly disagrees. Turkey’s Nov. 24 downing of a Russian military jet in Syria caused a dramatic rupture in ties, and the enraged government of Russian President Vladimir Putin had no scruples about embracing “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” strategy.
In the wake of the plane crisis, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his aides moved to accelerate projects to reduce Turkey’s dependence on Russian natural gas. Russia supplies 55% of the gas Turkey consumes, and Gazprom lists Turkey as its second-largest buyer after Germany.
For Turkey, the only quick alternative lies in the rich gas fields of neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan. With 5 trillion cubic meters (176 trillion cubic feet) of gas reserves, Iraqi Kurdistan whets the appetite of international investors and is eager to put its gas on the global market. Ankara’s game plan is simple: Begin building a pipeline this year, and get the gas flowing in 2019. Officials say the pipeline will have an initial capacity of 10 billion cubic meters a year, before a twofold increase in a short period of time.
That timing would be perfect, as some of Turkey’s major gas contracts with Russia expire in 2020, including the Blue Stream deal for 16 billion cubic meters, and half of the western route contracts that cover 4 billion cubic meters. In short, if everything goes as planned, Ankara hopes to get rid of Putin’s noose in several years.
Quickly rolling up its sleeves, Turkey collected bids for the Turkish section of the pipeline Feb. 9. In an intriguing coincidence, the PYD office in Moscow opened with fanfare the following day. And a week later, the Kurdistan Communities Union, the PKK's executive council, announced it would not allow the pipeline project to proceed. To show it meant business, the PKK leadership put on a little show of force. On Feb. 17, PKK militants blew up a Turkish section of the oil pipeline that ships Iraqi and Kurdish crude to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. The conduit, which carries 600,000 barrels of oil per day, remained closed for 23 days, dealing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) a reported blow of $300 million and further shaking its already struggling economy.
This, however, was not the first attack on what is often described as the Iraqi Kurds’ “economic lifeline.” PKK militants had also bombed the pipeline on July 29, disrupting exports for 21 days — which cost the KRG $250 million.
According to Akin Unver, a scholar of international relations at Istanbul’s Kadir Has University, the PKK’s pipeline bombings are a calculated strategy. “The attacks aim to derail Turkey’s ambition of becoming an international energy hub,” he said. “An increase in these attacks would either discourage investors from projects via Turkey or push financing costs above the estimates.”
Unver’s point is indeed critical. To overcome its financial bottleneck, the KRG needs to put its natural gas on the market as soon as possible, along with its oil. So it now has two options: either make a deal with the PKK or look for other routes to export its gas and oil.
In another twist here, a new player — Iran — has stepped into the game. Last week, Tehran was reported to have offered the KRG a new pipeline via Iran to safely export its oil.
Meanwhile, the PKK is targeting another major energy project — the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), designed to carry Caspian gas to Europe via Turkey in a bid to reduce European reliance on Russia. The conduit is to carry 36 billion cubic meters of gas per year, of which 21 billion cubic meters will go to European countries. Construction began a year ago, and on July 30 the PKK attacked a freight train transporting construction materials for TANAP, killing a railway worker. Intriguingly, reports emerged the same day that Turkish-Russian talks on the Turkish Stream — a rival project to carry Russian gas to Europe — had been suspended.
The PKK also has targeted a pipeline that carries 6 billion cubic meters of Azeri gas to Turkey annually, via Georgia. The conduit was blown up twice in August. The 13-day interruption in the flow meant some $200 million in losses for Azerbaijan.
According to Fatih Ozbay, a scholar at Istanbul Technical University specializing in Russia, Ankara’s crisis with Moscow was a long-sought opportunity for the PKK. “The PKK leadership had long scrambled to enlist Russia’s support. The rupture between Ankara and Moscow handed them this opportunity on a silver plate,” he said.
Commenting also on Russia's thinking, he said, “For the Russians, energy means both money and power. While half of its federal budget revenues come from oil and gas sales, Russia sees energy also as an efficient diplomatic weapon and doesn’t hesitate to use it when necessary.
"The truth of the matter is that the Kremlin was already unhappy with the projects to carry gas from the Caspian and northern Iraq because they are bound to curb its influence over Turkey and the European Union. So the plane crisis came in very handy, providing the PKK with legitimacy and Russia with an opportunity of direct contact with the forces that could disrupt those projects.”
Whether Ankara can break free from Putin’s pincers depends on how the PKK problem in Turkey develops. In 2012, Erdogan managed to bring the PKK to the negotiating table, enlisting the support of the United States, Britain, the EU and Russia. Today, he is left with no friends but Saudi Arabia, Qatar and arguably Israel. He could hardly bring the PKK back to the table at a time when the Kurds — unlike him — enjoy strong Western sympathy for their fight against the Islamic State.
This stalemate has come to threaten not only Turkey’s national security but also its energy supplies. Any delay in the energy projects, meanwhile, means more money flowing to Russia’s coffers.
