Syria: Turkey and the Syrian Kurds aim for the Islamic State's capital, Raqqa

Obama's support for the Saudi Arabian genocide in Yemen is nicely balanced by his support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, known as the YPG.

Syrian Kurds are the only democratic ,non-sectarian, feminist organized group in the Middle East and deserve full-throated support from all nations, including Germany, France,  Great Britain, Russia, and China.

None should not be shy about throwing their support behind he YPG, challenging Erdoğan and his Turkish dictatorship, as Obama is doing.  (The Gulf Cooperation Council will also be challenged, as it should be.)

Here's hoping Obama succeeds in Syria and manages to humanize Saudi Arabia as he appears to be slowly trying to do.  To slowly for my taste.


The Washington Post article is clear  and helpful in understanding Syria and its future.  Highly recommended

THE WASHINGTON POST

‘We’re not in perfect control’: U.S. plans operation against Islamic State in Syria despite obstacles

A member of Syrian Democratic Forces surveys the town of Manbij, Syria, on Sept. 25. After pushing the Islamic State out of Manbij in August, the U.S.-backed group will turn its attention to nearby Raqqa. (Ayham Al-Mohammad/AFP/Getty Images)

By Missy Ryan and Karen DeYoung October 31 at 7:48 PM 

The Obama administration is racing to settle questions that could scuttle a planned offensive against the Islamic State in the Syrian city of Raqqa that Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter has said will begin “within weeks . . . and not many weeks.”

Senior administration officials have attributed the newly described urgency to Raqqa’s symbolic role as the “capital of the caliphate” claimed by the militants and intelligence indicating that it is the center of Islamic State planning for terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States.

[With the battle for Mosul underway, U.S. sets sights on Raqqa]

But the officials acknowledged a wealth of problems that could derail the offensive, including the need to gather and train additional Syrian forces. More ominously, they cite the explosive dynamics between two allies: Turkey and Syrian Kurdish fighters, who form the bulk of the existing offensive force.

“This is one of the situations in which we have contacts and influence over all the actors. But we’re not in perfect control,” said one of several officials who discussed the operation on the condition of anonymity to speak candidly about its planning and potential pitfalls.

The uneasy mix of forces battling the Islamic State VIEW GRAPHIC 

President Obama approved the Raqqa plan in meetings with top national security aides in early October. But concerns about unresolved problems have put off initial hopes that the offensive could take place simultaneously with a major operation to retake the Iraqi city of Mosul that began two weeks ago.

Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend, the U.S. commander of the anti-Islamic State coalition, described the current Raqqa plan as “overlapping” the Mosul offensive. “We want to pressure Raqqa” so that militants escaping Mosul do not “have a convenient place to go,” Townsend said last week, after Carter’s description of the timing during a news conference at NATO.

The Pentagon, at least temporarily, has withdrawn a controversial request to provide direct arms shipments to the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, known as the YPG, which forms the bulk of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces slated to undertake the Raqqa offensive. Consideration of the weapons was deferred, officials said, because initial plans to encircle the city by taking control of surrounding villages and access routes would not require additional weaponry and because conflicts with Turkey remain unresolved.

Turkey, a NATO ally and part of the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State, considers the YPG a terrorist force, allied with Turkey’s own Kurdish separatist movement. Its concern has grown as the Syrian Kurds, with strong U.S. backing, have taken control of much of the Syria-Turkey border from the militants.

In August, after the YPG-

dominated Syrian Democratic Forces pushed the Islamic State from the city of Manbij, northwest of Raqqa, Turkey struck back with a cross-border air and ground offensive against the Kurds.

Since then, Turkish troops and a force of about 1,000 Arab fighters from the separate Free Syrian Army have occupied a 15-mile-deep stretch along the border inside Syria. The Turkish goal is to create a 5,000-square-mile area free of the Islamic State and the Kurds, including the northwestern cities of al-Bab, Azaz and Jarabulus, U.S. officials said.

In a statement Thursday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that once his forces take Islamic State-held al-Bab, the plan is to move onward to Raqqa.

Erdogan said Thursday that he had urged Obama in a telephone call the night before not to involve the YPG in a Raqqa offensive. “We shared our plans with him,” Erdogan said in public remarks. “We said, ‘Come, let’s kick Daesh out of Raqqa together.’ ” Daesh and ISIL are alternate terms for the Islamic State.

Administration officials described the call differently. Obama, they said, told Erdogan in no uncertain terms that the decision had been made to launch the initial phase of the offensive to isolate Raqqa, using the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as the only force capable of succeeding. The United States would work to control the Kurds, but Turkey needed to support the coalition-backed operation or stay out of the way.

[Erdogan reasserts Turkey’s role in wars in Syria and Iraq]

Townsend emphasized the same point in a Thursday news conference. Turkey’s fight against the Kurdish forces, he said, was “not helpful for the coalition. And we ask members of the coalition to refrain from undertaking activities that are not focused on the defeat of Daesh.”

As far as Turkey joining the Raqqa offensive, Townsend said, “We’ll welcome any contributing nation that wants to make themselves part of the coalition.” But, he said, “that can’t just come with a whole bunch of strings. They’ve got to be willing to do what the coalition needs done.”

“The threat to the Raqqa campaign is less that [Turkish-backed forces] . . . race to Raqqa ahead of the SDF,” a senior official said. “What could derail it is if there’s a huge dust-up between Arabs and Kurds . . . potentially around al-Bab that creates a huge sucking sound” and drains both fighters and focus from the Raqqa offensive.

To further complicate the situation, the potential explosion in and around al-Bab is within shooting distance of Aleppo, where Syria’s civil war is raging between rebels and government forces and their Russian and Iranian allies. “A lot of forces could collide,” the official said.

[Little consensus within administration on how to stop fall of Aleppo to Assad]  (Worth scanning.)

The operation to encircle Raqqa is expected to take about a month, the official said. “The next phase is tightening the noose,” and then “you’ll see thousands of people moving south” toward the city.

Officials said the SDF numbers about 50,000 fighters, mostly Kurds but including about 10,000 Arabs, Turkmens and Christians.

Planners anticipate that as many as 10,000 militants may be massed inside Raqqa by then, requiring an offensive force at least that big. At that point, officials said, the request to arm the SDF — including with antitank weapons and earthmoving equipment to break militant defenses — is likely to be back on the table.

A small force of U.S. Special Operations personnel has been operating alongside the Kurdish-led force for months and has assessed it to be sufficient for an assault on Raqqa. The hands-on U.S. support, the official said, “helps us keep them focused.”

Military officials also appear confident that coalition air and artillery attacks will give that relatively small force a decisive edge against the militants.

Turkey is not alone in expressing concerns, however.

Jennifer Cafarella, a scholar at the Institute for the Study of War, said the United States would need a relatively larger, more effective partner in Raqqa than it has in Mosul — where the coalition is aiding a massive Iraqi military force — because its support capacity is much smaller in Syria.

Others have also questioned whether U.S. reliance on Kurdish-dominated forces to liberate an ethnically Arab city could create new conflicts and play into jihadist propaganda.

A key element of the U.S. plan is the expectation that Kurdish forces would spearhead the early stages of the operation, capturing and holding towns around Raqqa, and other SDF fighters would lead the assault into the Arab city to avoid inflaming the ethnic tensions that have characterized recent Kurdish advances.

But similar plans have run into difficulties elsewhere, including in Manbij, where Kurdish forces remained — despite U.S. promises that they would leave once the city was captured — and then began to head north toward the Turkish border.

The prospect of expanded weaponry could provide a powerful incentive for the YPG to move toward Raqqa, even as it pursues its larger goal of securing greater territory and political power across Syria. U.S. officials have warned the Kurds that they won’t get continued military assistance if they act against American interests by confronting the Turks.

Nasir Haj Mansour, an adviser to the SDF leadership, said Kurdish priorities could be reconciled with the American objective of retaking Raqqa. YPG forces will take part in the operation, he said, “but the level and the nature of the involvement hasn’t been defined yet.”

Although there are far fewer civilians in Raqqa than the estimated 1.5 million in Mosul, concerns have also been voiced about planning for what happens there after the Islamic State is ejected.

“There’s a choice here that the American administration has to make, between doing this expeditiously and doing this right, in a way that is sustainable,” said Robert Ford, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria who is now a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute.

Adam Entous in Washington and Zakaria Zakaria in Istanbul contributed to this report.

Support for Yemeni self-government

"interesting" to note the differences in a United States  outlet and a Pakistani one.


UN envoy says restoring ceasefire 'critical' for Yemen - World - Dunya News  DuynaNews, Pakistan, said to be the most popularUrdu tv station in Pakistan.

UN Envoy: Military Escalation in Yemen Is Fueling Extremists - ABC News

Both assert the importance of former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh.  Saleh was president of Yemen for three decades.  When confronted with a popular uprising engendered by the Arab Spring the Saudi and the United States "persuaded" him to leave Yemen -- taking with him what a UN Panel of Experts says is somewhere between 3B and 66B dollars.

Saleh went into exile in Canada.

See Al Monitor, Yemen's Saleh proves to be a survivor for a summary of this remarkable and dangerous man's career.  An excerpt from that article is:

Saleh is also grooming his son to be Yemen's next leader. Ahmed Ali, 42, is a key player in turning the military against Hadi. Hadi made him ambassador to the United Arab Emirates to get him out of the country, but it didn't work. Many Yemenis believe the two Salehs have been more important in the Houthis' successes than the Iranians. Without Saleh, it is unlikely the Houthis could have taken control of the capital.

The United Nations imposed sanctions on Saleh, including a travel ban and assets freeze for working with the Houthis against Hadi in November 2014. The Saudis were instrumental in getting the sanctions passed. The UN experts report also accused Saleh of working with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to arrange assassinations of Hadi supporters.

Saleh is Saudi Arabia's bete noire. The royal family has wanted him gone for 2½ decades. His home village and stronghold was been bombed this week by the Royal Saudi Air Force. Saleh famously said that ruling fractious Yemen is like dancing on the heads of snakes. He is the consummate snake dancer.

Saleh is still dancing. On the night of March 28, in a televised address on Houthi-controlled media, he appealed for an end to the "barbaric" air attacks and for there to be a cease-fire and elections. He promised that neither he nor his son would be a candidate for president but also ruled out Hadi's return. By coming out publicly, Saleh seems to be trying to play the role of senior statesman. There are rumors that Ahmed Ali Saleh has been in Riyadh trying to broker a deal. Saleh bears huge responsibility for the disaster his country and its neighbors now confront, a failing state turning into a quagmire. But the survivor still wants to play.

Both of the articles and the United States government insist that there be new elections in Yemen, ignoring the 100-000-person turnout for an elected government that Saudi Arabia would like to ignore since it is backed by Saleh.

[ ASÍ VA ESPAÑA ] Manifestación en Yemen (leer + dentro)

Yemen conflict: Major pro-rebel demonstration in Sanaa - BBC News

See also مسيرة 20 أغسطس الكبرى في "السبعين" بصنعاء

يوم مشهود في صنعاء باحتشاد جماهيري ملاييني أغرق ساحة ميدان السبعين والشوارع والأحياء المجاورة يوم السبت 20 أغسطس تأييداً للمجلس السياسي الأعلى واستقلالية القرار الوطني واستئناف البرلمان جلسات انعقاده.  بالصور- مسيرة 20 أغسطس الكبرى في "السبعين" بصنعاء | وكالة خبر للأنباء

Snipers protecting the crowd. BBC 

Yemen conflict: Major pro-rebel demonstration in Sanaa - BBC News

Saleh illustrates the cautionary tale "Be careful what you wish for."

WAR & CONFLICT 28 JULY 2016
Yemen: Houthi, Saleh council formation criticised by UN 

UN says groups establishing 10-member council to run the country is a "clear violation of the Yemeni constitution". 

The UN has criticised an agreement signed by Yemen's Houthi rebels and ousted president Ali Abdullah Saleh's party to form a political council to run the country.

Farhan Haq, spokesman of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, said on Thursday the "unilateral" decision was not in line with the peace process and endangered "the substantial progress made during the Kuwait talks.

"It is a clear violation of the Yemeni constitution and the provisions of the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] initiatives and implementation mechanism," Haq added.

The agreement was struck earlier on Thursday between Saleh's General Peoples' Congress Party (GPC) and Ansar Allah, the political arm of the rebel Houthi movement.

The proposed council would include 10 members - five from each side.

Yemen has been torn apart by conflict since 2014, when Houthi rebels, allied with troops loyal to Saleh, captured large swaths of the country, including the capital, Sanaa.

A coalition assembled by Saudi Arabia launched an air campaign against the rebels in March 2015. Since then, more than 9,000 people have been killed and 2.8 million driven from their homes.

In a statement published on Yemen's Houthi-run SABA news, the parties who signed the deal said "the insolence of the Saudi assault and its coalition in continuing to kill our people and destroy public and private properties" motivated the agreement.

It said the deal was signed by GPC deputy head Sadeq Abu Ras and the Houthis' Ansar Allah political council chief, Saleh al-Samad, and outlined a basis for running the country and managing state affairs on the basis of the existing constitution.

The statement also said the agreement would entail a rotating leadership, including a president and a deputy from each ally.

The talks under way in Kuwait have made little progress on UN peace proposals, which include a Houthi withdrawal from cities captured since 2014 and the creation of an inclusive, more democratic government.

Exiled President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi demands the implementation of the UN security council resolution which stipulates the withdrawal of armed groups from all cities. The Houthis demand a share of power in any new government.

Responding to the formation of the 10-member council, Yemen's government said on Thursday the peace "negotiations have completely ended".

"We have participated and exercised patience for the sake of our people and we end the negotiations for their sake,"  Abdullah al-Olaimi, deputy director of the Yemeni president's office and a member of the government team to the UN-brokered talks being held in Kuwait, said on his Twitter account.

In Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Hadi's government said the rebels had "fired the bullet of mercy", killing off the talks.

As you can see, any new government formed by the Yemeni faces major obstacles.

This blogger urges the United States and  Great Britain to forthwith recognize the newly formed government of Yemen as t22 January 2015he legatee government of Yemen.  It is surely more legitimate that the pretend-government of Hadi.  

Recognition would go some way toward redeeming the tarnished reputations of the United States and Great Britain, caused by their support of Saudi genocide in Yemen.

ANNEX I

Any reader who is fond of the writings of Franz Kafka or who is familiar with the intricate obfuscations of legitimate will appreciate the text of the he GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] initiatives, which the Yemeni fare being asked o submit to in the Kuwait talks.  Note that the "President" referred to in the legalese is Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, who fled to Saudi Arabia in fear of his life and resigned his presidency on 22 January 2015, but once safely in Saudi Arabia, with on  constitutional authority he "rescinded" his resignation.  Hadi is hated by the people of his country.

Obtained by the Yemen Peace Project
Although the GCC agreement was signed in Riyadh almost three months ago, most people have never seen a full text of the document, or of the implementation mechanism that was signed with it. Newspapers have only published quotations or summaries. Thanks to our friend in San`a, Abdulaziz al-Sakkaf, we’re able to finally publish here the official English translation of the Implementation Mechanism. I plan to provide some commentary on this at some point, but for now, the document is here for all to read.

Translated from Arabic

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Agreement on the implementation mechanism for the transition process in Yemen in
accordance with the initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

Contents:

Part I. Introduction

Part II. The transition period

Part III. First phase of the transition

Part IV. Second phase of the transfer of power

Part V . Settlement of disputes

Part VI. Concluding provisions

Annex: Draft Presidential Decree

Part I. Introduction

1. The two parties recognize that

(a) As a result of the deadlock in the political transition, the political, economic,
humanitarian and security situation has deteriorated with increasing rapidity and the
Yemeni people have suffered great hardship;

(b) Our people, including youth, have legitimate aspirations for change; and

(c) This situation requires that all political leaders should fulfil their responsibilities towards
the people by immediately engaging in a clear process for transition to good democratic
governance in Yemen.

2. The two parties deeply appreciate the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and its
Secretary-General, the United Nations Secretary General acting through his Special Adviser,
the ambassadors of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and those of the
GCC and the European Union, to support an agreement on the peaceful transfer of power.
The two parties adopt this Mechanism on the basis of the GCC initiative and fully in
accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 2014 (2011).

3. The following definitions shall apply in relation to this Agreement:

(a) The term “GCC Initiative” refers to the GCC initiative to resolve the Yemeni crisis in the
draft of 21 and 22 May 2011;

(b) The term “the Mechanism” refers to this Agreement on the implementation mechanism
for the transition process in Yemen in accordance with the GCC Initiative;

(c) The term “the two parties” refers to the National Coalition (General People’s Congress
and its allies) as one party, and the National Council (Joint Meeting Parties their
partners) as the other.

4. The GCC Initiative and the Mechanism shall supersede any current constitutional or legal
arrangements. They may not be challenged before the institutions of the State.

Part II. The transition period

5. The two parties acknowledge that under Presidential Decree No. 24 of 2011, the President of
Yemen irrevocably delegated to the Vice-President the presidential powers to negotiate, sign
and bring into force this Mechanism, along with all constitutional powers pertaining to its
implementation and follow-up. Those powers include calling for early elections and taking
all of the decisions necessary to form a government of national unity, including swearing in
its members, as well as establishing the other bodies set forth in this Mechanism.

6. The transition period shall enter into effect as follows:

(a) In accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 2014 (2011), which notes
the commitment by the President of Yemen to immediately sign the GCC Initiative and
encourages him, or those authorized to act on his behalf, to do so, and to implement a
political settlement based upon it, and in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 24 of
2011, the President or the Vice-President acting on his behalf shall sign the GCC
Initiative concurrently with the signature of this Mechanism by the two parties.

(b) Concurrently with the signing of this Mechanism, and acting under the powers delegated
by the President in Presidential Decree No. 24 of 2011, the Vice-President shall issue a
decree providing for early presidential elections to be held within 90 days of the entry
into force of this Mechanism. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Constitution, the decree shall enter into force 60 days before the elections. The draft text
of the Decree is annexed to this Mechanism (Annex 1).

(c) This Mechanism shall enter into force when the President or Vice-President has signed
the GCC Initiative, all parties have signed this Mechanism in accordance with this
paragraph, and the decree referred to in subparagraph (b) above has been issued.

7. The transition period shall begin with the entry into force of this Mechanism. The transition period shall then consist of two phases:

(a) The first phase shall begin with the entry into force of this Mechanism and end with the inauguration of the President following the early presidential elections;

(b) The second phase, which shall last for two years, shall begin with the inauguration of the President following the early presidential elections. It shall end with the holding of
general elections in accordance with the new Constitution and the inauguration of the
new President of the Republic.

8. During the first and second stages of the transition, decisions of Parliament shall be taken by consensus. If consensus on any given topic cannot be reached, the Speaker of Parliament shall refer the matter for decision by the Vice-President in the first phase, or the President in the second phase. That decision shall be binding for the two parties.

9. The two parties shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Parliament adopts the legislation and other laws necessary for the full implementation of commitments in respect of the guarantees set forth in the GCC Initiative and this Mechanism.

Part III. First phase of the transitional period

Formation of the government of national unity

10. Immediately on entry into force of the GCC Initiative and the Mechanism, the opposition
shall nominate its candidate for the post of Prime Minister. The Vice-President shall issue a
presidential decree requesting that person to form a government of national unity. The
government of national unity shall be formed within 14 days of the issuance of the decree. A
republican decree shall be issued to that effect and signed by the Vice-President and Prime
Minister;

(a) Each party shall account for 50 per cent of nominees for the government of national unity,
and due consideration shall be given to the representation of women. With regard to the
distribution of portfolios, one of the two parties shall prepare two lists of ministries and
transmit them to the other party, which shall have the right to choose one of the lists.

(b) The Prime Minister-designate shall appoint the members of the government as proposed by
the two parties. The Vice-President shall then issue a decree setting forth the agreed names
of the cabinet members. Nominees shall have a high standard of accountability and
commitment to human rights and international humanitarian law.

11. The members of the government shall take the constitutional oath before the Vice-President.
Within ten days, the government of national unity shall submit its programme to Parliament
for a vote of confidence within five days.

Functioning of the government of national unity

12. The government of national unity shall take its decisions by consensus. If there is no full
consensus on any given matter, the Prime Minister shall consult with the Vice-President or,
after the early presidential elections, the President, in order to reach consensus. If consensus
between them is not possible, the Vice-President or, after the early presidential elections, the
President, shall take the final decision.

13. Immediately after its formation, the government of national unity shall

(a) Take the necessary steps, in consultation with the other relevant actors, to ensure the
cessation of all forms of violence and violations of humanitarian law; end the
confrontation of armed forces, armed formations, militias and other armed groups;
ensure their return to barracks; ensure freedom of movement for all through the country;
protect civilians; and take the other necessary measures to achieve peace and security
and extend State control;

(b) Facilitate and secure humanitarian access and delivery wherever it is needed;

(c) Issue appropriate legal and administrative instructions for all branches of the State sector
to comply immediately with standards of good governance, the rule of law and respect
for human rights;

(d) Issue specific legal and administrative instructions to the Office of the Public Prosecutor,
the police, prisons and security forces to act in accordance with the law and international
standards, and to release those unlawfully detained;

(e) The government of national unity shall comply with all resolutions of the Security
Council and Human Rights Council and with the relevant international norms and
conventions.

Powers of the Vice-President and government of national unity

14. In implementing this Mechanism, the Vice-President shall exercise the following
constitutional powers, in addition to those appertaining to his office:

(1) Convening early presidential elections;
(2) Exercising all functions of the President in respect of Parliament;
(3) Announcing the formation of, and swearing in, the government of national unity in the
first phase;
(4) All functions relating to the work of the Committee on Military Affairs for Achieving
Security and Stability;
(5) Managing foreign affairs to the extent necessary for the implementation of this
Mechanism;
(6) Issuing the decrees necessary for the implementation of this Mechanism.

15. In the first phase, the Vice-President and government of national unity shall exercise
executive authority encompassing all matters pertaining to this Agreement, including the
following, acting in conjunction with Parliament where appropriate:

(a) Formulating and implementing an initial programme of economic stabilization and
development and addressing the immediate needs of the population in all regions of
Yemen;

(b) Coordinating relations with development donors;

(c) Ensuring that governmental functions, including local government, are fulfilled in an
orderly manner in accordance with the principles of good governance, rule of law,
human rights, transparency and accountability;

(d) Approving an interim budget, supervising the administration of all aspects of State
finance and ensuring full transparency and accountability;

(e) Taking the necessary legislative and administrative steps to ensure that presidential
elections are held within 90 days of the entry into force of this Mechanism;

(f) Establishing the following institutions as provided for by this Mechanism:

(1) Committee on Military Affairs for Achieving Security and Stability;

(2) Conference for National Dialogue.

(g) The government of national unity and the Vice-President shall immediately establish a
liaison committee to engage effectively with youth movements from all parties in the
squares and elsewhere in Yemen, to disseminate and explain the terms of this Agreement;
initiate an open conversation about the future of the country, which will be continued
through the comprehensive Conference for National Dialogue; and involve youth in
determining the future of political life.

Committee on Military Affairs for Achieving Security and Stability

16. Within five days of the entry into force of the GCC Initiative and the Mechanism, the Vice-
President in the first transitional phase shall establish and chair a Committee on Military
Affairs for Achieving Security and Stability. The Committee shall work to

(a) End the division in the armed forces and address its causes;

(b) End all of the armed conflicts;

(c) Ensure that the armed forces and other armed formations return to their camps; end all
armed presence in the capital Sana’a and other the cities; and remove militias and
irregular armed groups from the capital and other cities;

(d) Remove road blocks, checkpoints and improvised fortifications in all governorates;

(e) Rehabilitate those who do not meet the conditions for service in the military and security
forces;

(f) Take any other measures to reduce the risk of armed confrontation in Yemen.

17. During the two transitional phases, the Committee on Military Affairs for Achieving
Security and Stability shall also work to create the necessary conditions and take the
necessary steps to integrate the armed forces under unified, national and professional
leadership in the context of the rule of law.

Early presidential elections

18.(*) The early presidential elections shall be held in accordance with the following provisions:

(*) Translator’s note: this paragraph is mis-numbered 20 in the original Arabic text.

(a) The elections shall take place within 90 days of the signature of the GCC Initiative
and the Mechanism;

(b) The early elections for the post of President shall be organized and supervised by the
Higher Commission for Elections and Referendums using the current register of
voters on an exceptional basis. Any citizen, male or female, who has attained the
legal age for voting and can establish as much on the basis of an official document
such as a birth certificate or national identity card, shall have the right to vote on the
basis of that document;

(c) The sides commit not to nominate or endorse any candidate for the early presidential
elections except for the consensus candidate Vice-President Abd Rabbuh Mansur
Hadi;

(d) The Secretary-General of the United Nations is requested to provide and coordinate
electoral assistance to help ensure the orderly and timely holding of elections.

Part IV. Second phase of the transfer of power

Functions and powers of the President and government of national unity

19.(†) After the early Presidential elections, the newly elected President and the Government of
national unity shall exercise all of their customary functions as set forth in the Constitution.
In addition, they shall exercise the powers necessary to continue the tasks specified for the
implementation of the first phase, and additional tasks specified for the second phase of the
transfer of power. The latter include

(†) Translator’s note: this paragraph is mis-numbered 21 in the original Arabic text.

(a) Ensuring that the Conference for National Dialogue is convened, and forming a
preparatory committee for the Conference, as well as an Interpretation Committee and
other bodies established pursuant to this Mechanism;

(b) Establishing a process of constitutional reform that will address the structure of the State
and the political system, and submitting the amended Constitution to the Yemeni people
in a referendum;

(c) Reforming the electoral system; and

(d) Holding elections for Parliament and the Presidency in accordance with the new
Constitution.

Conference for National Dialogue

20.(‡) With the beginning of the second transitional phase, the President-elect and the government
of national unity shall convene a comprehensive Conference for National Dialogue for all
forces and political actors, including youth, the Southern Movement, the Houthis, other
political parties, civil society representatives and women. Women must be represented in
all participating groups.

(‡) Translator’s note: this paragraph is mis-numbered 18 in the original Arabic text.

21.(§)The Conference shall discuss the following issues:

(§) Translator’s note: this paragraph is mis-numbered 19 in the original Arabic text.

(a) The process of drafting the Constitution, including the establishment of a
Constitutional Drafting Commission and its membership;

(b) Constitutional reform, addressing the structure of the State and political system, and
submitting constitutional amendments to the Yemeni people through a referendum;

(c) The dialogue shall address the issue of the South in a manner conducive to a just
national solution that preserves the unity, stability and security of Yemen.

(d) Examination of the various issues with a national dimension, including the causes of
tension in Saada;

(e) Taking steps towards building a comprehensive democratic system, including reform
of the civil service, the judiciary and local governance;

(f) Taking steps aimed at achieving national reconciliation and transitional justice, and
measures to ensure that violations of human rights and humanitarian law do not
occur in future;

(g) The adoption of legal and other means to strengthen the protection and rights of
vulnerable groups, including children, as well as the advancement of women;

(h) Contributing to determining the priorities of programmes for reconstruction and
sustainable economic development in order to create job opportunities and better
economic, social and cultural services for all.

Constitutional Commission

22. The government of national unity shall establish a Constitutional Commission immediately
on the conclusion of the work of the Conference of National Dialogue within six months.
The Commission shall prepare a new draft constitution within three months of the date of its
establishment. It shall propose the necessary steps for the draft constitution to be discussed
and submitted for referendum in order to ensure broad popular participation and
transparency.

Organization of elections under the new Constitution

23. Within three months of the adoption of the new Constitution, Parliament shall enact a law
convening national parliamentary elections and, if provided for by the Constitution,
presidential elections. The Higher Commission for Elections and Referendums shall be
reconstituted and the new register of voters re-compiled in accordance with the new
Constitution. That law will be subject to subsequent review by the newly elected Parliament.

24. The term of the President elected under paragraph 7 of this Mechanism shall end upon the
inauguration of the President elected under the new Constitution.

Part V. Settlement of disputes

25. Within 15 days of the entry into force of the GCC Initiative and the Mechanism, the Vice-
President and the Prime Minister of the government of national unity shall form an
Interpretation Committee to which the two parties shall refer in order to resolve any dispute
regarding the interpretation of the GCC Initiative or the Mechanism.

Part VI. Concluding provisions

26. Women shall appropriately represented in all of the institutions referred to in this
Mechanism.

27. The Government shall provide adequate funding for the institutions and activities
established by this Mechanism.

28. In order to ensure the effective implementation of this Mechanism, the two parties call on
the States members of the GCC and the United Nations Security Council to support its
implementation. They further call on the States members of the GCC, the permanent
members of the Security Council, the European Union and its States members to support the
implementation of the GCC Initiative and the Mechanism.

29. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is called upon to provide continuous
assistance, in cooperation with other agencies, for the implementation of this Agreement. He
is also requested to coordinate assistance from the international community for the
implementation of the GCC Initiative and the Mechanism.

30. The following are invited to attend the signature of this Mechanism: the Secretary-General
of the GCC and the Secretary-General of the United Nations or their representatives, as well
as the representatives of the States members of the GCC, the permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council, the European Union and the League of Arab States.

(Signatures and dates)

Annex

Exercising(**) the authority conferred on me by the President under Presidential Decree No. 24 of
2011, I hereby solemnly convene elections for the office of President of the Republic to be held on
00/00/2012. This Decree is deemed to be in force from today, and the convening of elections
contained therein is irrevocable. The convening of elections shall take effect in accordance with the
provisions of the Mechanism, without any need for any further steps, sixty days before the holding
of elections as set forth in the Mechanism.

** Translator’s note: On the basis of the unofficial English translation, the following may be missing from the Arabic
text:

” Annex: Decree issued by the Vice-President concurrently with the signature of the GCC Initiative and the Mechanism.

The Vice-President of the Republic, acting under to the authority conferred on him by the President under Presidential
Decree No. 24 of 2011.”

This decree shall be published in the Official Gazette.

Bahrain, a microcosmsm of Middle East contradictions

Bahrain is torn asunder, ripped apart by "friends" in the Gulf Cooperation Council and by the United States and  Great Britain, by its own arrogant mistreatment of human beings who worship in ways distasteful to Saudi, to religious zealots who worship the way the Islamic State worships (and the way Saudi Arabia warships).

Bahrain is a majority Shiite country, and some of  its Sunni people pent many years in Iran.  None gives allegiance to the Iranian Ayatollah, yet the West's propaganda machine persists in blaming Iran for all problems of its own making.

The Royal Family  --

-- stiff, out of touch 

(though staunch football supporters) --

Bahrain itself is a tiny island in the Persian Gulf, with Saudi Arabia to the east an Qatar to the southwest:

Bahrain Map, Flag. Capital Manama

This map is accompanied by this text,

which seems accurate:

The Kingdom of Bahrain is an independent Arab nation in western Asia, part of the region known as the Middle East. It is made up of 36 islands on the western side of the Persian Gulf, between Saudi Arabia to the east and Qatar to the west. The main island, also known as Bahrain, is home to the country’s capital and largest city, Manama.
More than 60 percent of Bahrain’s population is native-born, in contrast to the populations of other Persian Gulf states such as Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, where foreign-born inhabitants outnumber the native population. Bahrain also differs from its neighbors in that the number of followers of Shia Islam in the country is more than double that of the adherents of Sunni Islam, which is the largest group of Muslims worldwide. The Sunnis control the country’s government, however.
In the 1930s Bahrain became the first Arab state in the Persian Gulf region to develop an oil-based economy, but by the early 1980s its oil fields were mostly depleted. However, the country had prepared for this change by investing in other industries, and its economy continues to prosper.

The many contradictory forces tearing at Bahrain are detailed in the nAl Monitor news article below.  The article is not easy to follow if you are not familiar with the names, and is worth the trouble of reading with care, if you would see a part of the many contradictory forces at work today in the Middle East, and understand Obama's courageous, reasonable restraint (assuming that  is, for unstated reasons, that it is good to befriend Saudi Arabia).

gulf PULSEنبض الخليج

Shiite Bahraini men sit on a wall with graffiti that reads ''People want self-determination" as they attend a rally held by the Al-Wefaq opposition party, in the village of Boori, south of Manama, Oct. 14, 2011, to mark the eight-month anniversary of the February 14 uprising.  (photo by REUTERS/Hamad I Mohammed)

What Bahrain’s opposition crackdown means for country’s Brotherhood

On the heels of a Bahraini court suspending Al-Wefaq for the Shiite society’s alleged role in creating "an environment for terrorism, extremism and violence,” Bahrain’s rulers delivered a powerful message June 20 by annulling Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim’s Bahraini citizenship.

Author Giorgio CafieroPosted June 27, 2016

Following five years of stalemate, the Bahraini leadership sees no purpose in engaging the Shiite opposition and instead favors eliminating Shiites who call for the government’s dissolution from political life in the island. By excluding popular political groups from Bahrain’s political arena amid a wider crackdown, however, there are risks of militancy gaining broader power and appeal within the Shiite opposition.

Throughout the past five years, Manama has grown increasingly reliant on Gulf Arab and Western allies. The Shiite-led Arab Spring uprising unsettled Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders fearful of Bahrain aligning with Tehran following a popular Shiite revolution. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were quick to deploy ground forces to the island by March 2011 to help Bahrain's rulers quash the uprising.

Manama’s participation in the US-led military campaign against the Islamic State (IS) and the kingdom’s “pricey PR push” on K Street seem to have further consolidated Bahrain’s alliance with Washington, despite some diplomatic spats over the past five years. Despite the Department of Defense’s congressionally mandated contingency plans for relocating the Navy’s 5th Fleet, Washington is unlikely to undergo the massive undertaking of moving the Persian Gulf’s most powerful naval force to another facility. The United Kingdom’s plans for a permanent base in Mina Salman, Bahrain, announced in 2014, underscore Manama’s important role in London’s strategic return “East of Suez” 40 years after the Royal Navy’s official departure from the Gulf. 

Unquestionably, allies in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Washington and London have prevented the Al Khalifa rulers from being pressured into negotiating a resolution to the kingdom’s crisis.

The king’s Sunni Islamist support networks

The ruling family’s ties with the Bahraini Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing, Minbar, and the more conservative Salafi society, Asala, to counterbalance the Shiite opposition has been another pillar of the regime’s strategy for standing strong since 2011.

Formed in 1984, Minbar’s platform reflects Bahrain’s liberal (by GCC standards) social environment, particularly with respect to women’s rights, although the group has close connections with the Muslim Brotherhood’s Kuwaiti branch. Many of Minbar’s members belong to the Hawala tribe, Sunni Arabs who migrated to Persia before returning to the Arabian Peninsula’s eastern shore. The Bahraini Muslim Brothers are middle-class professionals, many of whom are teachers and police officers.

Despite pressure from other GCC states, Manama has not designated Minbar a “terrorist” organization. The Sunni Islamist society not only continues operating publicly, but Bahrain’s Royal Court and Islamic banking sector reportedly fund Minbar. In exchange, Bahrain’s Muslim Brothers have backed the government’s post-2011 crackdown. In February 2013, for example, Minbar boycotted the national dialogue to protest what the island’s Muslim Brothers saw as unacceptable Shiite “silence” on violence plaguing the uprising’s two-year anniversary. At times, Minbar has even criticized the ruling family for responding too softly to Shiite dissent.

Despite Bahrain’s politically active Sunni Islamists supporting the regime during 2011, a growing number have made their own demands since that crisis erupted. In fact, Shiite protesters shared some of these demands such as releasing political prisoners and liberalizing Bahrain politically. Concerned about the possibility of Sunni opposition materializing, the state implemented electoral reforms to redraw boundaries before the 2014 elections. Consequently, Minbar and Asala only retained a combined three seats in the National Assembly’s Council of Representatives — down from five. Additionally, although Al-Wefaq was the main target of legislation passed last month to ban mixing religion with politics, the law also bodes poorly for Minbar and Asala — Bahrain’s second- and third-largest Islamist factions, respectively, after Al-Wefaq.

The influence of extremist ideologies in the kingdom’s Sunni communities is unsettling, particularly in light of numerous Bahraini Sunnis pledging allegiance to IS. As of January 2015, at least a dozen Bahrainis had joined Sunni militant organizations in Syria and Iraq. After King Hamad revoked Omar Bozboun’s Bahraini citizenship for joining IS, he responded by threatening to “enter Bahrain with blazing guns and behead the king.”

Turki al-Binali, a Salafi cleric hailing from a wealthy Sunni family allied with the Al Khalifas, is now IS’ leading preacher. Prior to leaving Bahrain in 2013, he held a rally in front of the US Embassy in Manama with his followers holding pictures of Osama bin Laden while waving al-Qaeda flags. Two and a half years after Binali left the kingdom, a Bahraini court tried him in absentia and nearly two dozen other Bahrainis on charges of seeking to topple the Manama regime and create an IS branch in the island. One family member, Mohamed Isa al-Binali, was an officer in the Interior Ministry overseeing Shiite inmates in Jaw Prison before defecting to IS in 2014.

There are several other reasons why Bahrain appears to be a logical destination for the group’s agenda. These include IS offshoots waging acts of terrorism in neighboring Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the presence of many Shiite Muslims and non-Muslim expatriates, the 5th Fleet being stationed in Bahrain, Manama’s role in the Washington-led military campaign against the group in Syria and the island’s reputation as the “brothel of the Gulf.”

Another threat to the nation’s stability stems from Manama granting Bahraini citizenship to Jordanian, Pakistani and Yemeni Sunnis to alter the country’s sectarian balance. Opposition voices in Bahrain maintain that these "naturalized Bahrainis" are Sunni “fundamentalists” who harbor anti-Shiite sentiments. As these non-Bahrainis earn their citizenship through service in Bahrain’s security apparatus, IS infiltration into the state’s military and police is a risk.

As underscored by the past several months of violent attacks targeting Bahrain’s security forces with improvised explosive devices and Molotov cocktails, the crackdown is failing to resolve the kingdom’s crisis. If the cancellation of Qassim’s citizenship and the court’s suspension of Al-Wefaq lead to the exacerbation of violence, the government will be forced to address an increasingly dire security crisis on top of managing social risks stemming from austerity measures amid an era of cheap oil — itself a contributing factor to the island’s sectarian issues.

As sectarian temperatures rise in the Gulf with Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah officials harshly condemning Manama’s annulment of Qassim’s citizenship and Iraqi Shiite forces retaking Fallujah from IS, the regime’s relationship with Minbar will be an important variable to observe as the Saudi-aligned monarchy seeks to maintain Sunni rule in a Shiite-majority island.

Looking ahead, will Minbar remain loyal to the Al Khalifas and continue viewing the crackdown as a safeguard against a Shiite takeover? Or will discontent over the Sunni Islamist society’s declining political influence cost the regime a key domestic ally? Will the regime continue seeing Minbar as a domestic ally against the Shiite opposition or as a gateway to IS? 

And see Bahrain: Analyzing Inequities Between Sunnis and Shiites

ahrain is again in the news this week. The country and Saudi Arabia are discussing acloser political union—with the obvious aim of safeguarding Sunni control in a Shiite majority country. Meanwhile, Shiite activists burned tires and blocked roads in a protest against detention policies.

Bahrain’s crisis has many causes: the Middle East’s wider Shiite-Sunni rivalry; the region’s longstanding Persian-Arab rivalry; ideas released during the Arab Spring; rising political aspirations from years of watching satellite television.

But the key driver is the horizontal inequities (i.e. inequalities between culturally formed groups) that exacerbate the fault line between the Shiites and Sunnis within the kingdom. Shiite demands may not all be reasonable, but their relative disadvantage in economic, social, and political spheres feed dissatisfaction, and promote instability. Reducing at least some of these inequities is crucial to reducing the instability, which otherwise is likely to fester for years to come.

Bahrain is a very tiny place—600,000 citizens (and about a million people in all) live on one archipelago of thirty-three islands. Shiites are in the majority, but no one really knows by how much. Although it is generally assumed (not least by the media) that the Shiites make up 65 to 75 percent of the population, one recent independent studyconcludes that they now make up less than 60 percent—and the share is dropping steadily. The government’s decade-long program of naturalizing Arab and non-Arab Sunnis from Yemen, Syria, Jordan and Pakistan, mostly for work in the police and military, is adding as many as 100,000 Sunnis citizens to the populace. The below map shows where each group lives.

Beneath this simple division lies a much more complex society comprised of groups and subgroups with different interests and agendas. There are Shiite Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula who have traditionally worked as farmers, pearl divers, and tradesmen; Shiites with Iranian roots who tend to be professionals and intellectuals; Sunnis from Arabia, from Iran, and “tribals” who have distant links to the region’s royal families. And then there are the more recent Sunni arrivals. Recent events, however, have polarized the country into a more rigid sectarian split.

Sunnis—especially those linked to the royal family—hold a disproportionate share of political power and have gained disproportionately from the country’s natural resource wealth. . . . 

Random images of official response to Shiite protests