NO US WAR WITH ASSAD; VIGOROUS US SUPPORT FOR SYRIAN KURDS

Some state department experts want the administration to go to war with the Syrian Government.

Vice President Biden and President Obama disagree, preferring that the United States continue to focus its ire on theIslamic State, with a provision of arms to Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) an the related Democratic Union Party [Kurdish:Partiya Yekîtiya Democrat‎, or PYD ] and its military arm, the  People's Protection Units (YPG).

Some senators and representatives and some Republican candidates for president have demanded war with Syria, but so far Republican congresspersons have refused to even hold hearings on a Declaration of War, so I discount their demand as shameful political posturing.

I can think of a number of reasons to support the president’s position:

1.  War is to be avoided if possible.

2.  United States’s war is dependent on a congressional resolution, which is lacking.

3. Salafi Jihadists, funded primarily by billionaires in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia ,and Qatar, are Wahhabi fanatics, just as the Islamic State is, religiously bound to spread Wahhabism to all non-believers, by killing them if necessary; they  are as harmful to the Syria people as the Assad regime is. See, e.g., Salafi armed groups increase attacks in Syria, Al-Monitor, April 24, 2016.  We cannot successfully fight them because of our decade-old subservience to Saudi Oil.

4.  There is no Syria civil war.  After the Arab Spring, Syrian middle-class businessmen and others in the middle class demonstrated for reforms.  Assad responded by killing many.  The Salafi Jihadists, all from outside Syria,  saw an opening to create a Wahhabi government in Syria and swarmed in.  At the same time, the Islamic State declared a caliphate in Northern Syrian  and prepared to move through Anbar Province in Iraq to conquer Mecca and Medina, the holiest of Muslim sites and a prerequisite for the caliphate claim to be realized.  The United States, to protect Saudi Arabia from the Islamic State, began bombing the Islamic State.  The Syrian Kurds saw an opportunity long longed-for , for independence and formed an autonomous region in northernSyria,  always intending to be an autonomous province of Syria.  Going to war with Syria makes no more sense than going to wear with Saudi Arabia.

5.  Going to war with Syria would complicate the Great Powers interests in Syria.  Iran wants a pipeline through Syria to the coast to pipe its natural gas to Europe and doesn’t want Qatar to have one, since they both draw natural gas from the Pars Field, the largest natural gas deposit in the wold; Qatar naturally wants an exclusive pipeline.  Russia doesn't want Qatar to have the pipeline because it would drive down Russia’s gas prices to Europe, a catastrophe to the Russian economy.  Russia is less concerned with Iranian gas to Europe, thinking it can work out accommodations with Iran over price.  Saudi Arabia naturally supports Qatar.  Assad supports the Iranian pipeline, but mainly doesn’t want to be killed.  Russia doesn’t give a damn about Assad;  it cares only about stopping the Qatar pipeline.  Thee is no apparent way to resolve the conflict and if the United States goes to war in Syria that would merely ad anther complication to the insolvable puzzle.

6.  Whatever else happens, the West has a moral duty to support Kurdish independence. In the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, England and France agreed with the Kurds to create an independent Kurdistan, the Kurds being one of the oldest ethnic groups in the world.  Under pressure from the Turkey, England and French instead assigned Kurds to four countries that did n’t want them, an into which they did not fit.  Assad treated  Kurds assigned to Syria badly. 

Syrian Kurds, when the had a chance, have respond with a political ideology which, according to Wikipedia includes these attributed:

Democratic socialism,

Libertarian socialism,

Kurdish nationalism,

Feminism,

Eco-socialism,

Social ecology,

Democratic Confederalism (more on this later),

Communalism 

You may not agree with all of these aims, but compare them to the surrounding theocratic despots!  Kurds are creating an island of sanity a sea of religious and dictatorial mania.  The United States and the European Union should give them full support. 

Contrary opinions are welcomed.  Syria is a long way from the middle of the Pacific Ocean an I know only what I read win various publications.  I am surely missing important matters.

The New York Times

Kerry Meets With State Dept. Dissenters Urging Action on Syria

By DAVID E. SANGERJUNE 21, 2016

Secretary of State John Kerry was careful not to differ from President Obama’s strategy at a meeting with dissenting Foreign Service officers, participants said.

WASHINGTON — The eight midlevel Foreign Service officers stepped into John Kerry’s formal outer office at the State Department on Tuesday — a room that few of them had ever entered before — to tell him that he was pursuing a path in Syria that would never bring an end to a gruesome civil war.

The argument was not new to Mr. Kerry — he, in fact, has offered versions of it himself in the Situation Room and the Oval Office. But for half an hour, according to several participants, the secretary of state and the eight officials engaged in a surprisingly cordial conversation about whether there was a way, in the last six months of the Obama presidency, to use American military force to help end a conflict that by some estimates has claimed 500,000 lives.

The eight were among 51 State Department employees who signed a “dissent channel” cable to Mr. Kerry last week, a letter that was leaked so quickly that it appeared clearly intended to send a message to President Obama that his own diplomats could not back his cautious policy.

Mr. Kerry, several participants said, was careful to never explicitly agree with their critique, or let on that he, too, has argued that President Bashar al-Assad of Syria will continue to bomb, starve and blockade his own people unless negotiations are backed by some form of military pressure.

But Mr. Kerry also gently pushed and probed, seeming to imply that many of the dissenters’ concerns had been considered many times before and rejected because they were more complicated than they appeared.

Hours before the meeting, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. seemed annoyed at a mention of the dissent cable, sounding a similar note on “CBS This Morning” that all the ideas proposed by the young diplomats had been looked at long ago.

“There is not a single, solitary recommendation that I saw that has a single, solitary answer attached to it — how to do what they’re talking about,” Mr. Biden said.

“The president’s been fastidious,” Mr. Biden told Charlie Rose. “Calls the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the intelligence community, the director of central intelligence, the C.I.A., et cetera. ‘Tell me what will work. Will this work?’ And the answer has repeatedly been, ‘No.’”

With only two of his aides in the room (and his Labrador retriever, Ben, who has attended delicate diplomatic meetings more than many assistant secretaries of state), Mr. Kerry raised a series of questions about what might happen if the dissenters won the day. What would be the legal basis for bombing Mr. Assad’s forces, in the absence of resolutions by the United Nations or even NATO? What would happen if American forces came into an accidental confrontation with the Russian Air Force, which has defended Mr. Assad? What if American pilots were shot down? How would the effort affect the American battle with the Islamic State?

The session was an unusual one. Only four or five dissent channel cables are written each year, and most stay confidential.

But the very public nature of this one has left Mr. Kerry in an awkward position. He does not want to appear to differ from the president’s strategy, and he kept his own counsel Tuesday about what he tells Mr. Obama in private. (Mr. Kerry’s aides insist that there is a common strategy, one that starts with trying to get Russia to press for enforcement of a much-violated cease-fire.)

At the same time, it is Mr. Kerry who first burst into public awareness when, as a just-returned naval officer in Vietnam, he issued his own famous dissent in 1971 by demanding before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?”

Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the meeting was that five years into the Syrian civil war — after Mr. Obama declared that Mr. Assad must go, the unenforced “red lines” and a series of failed cease-fire accords — even some of the people who ran Syria diplomacy day-to-day had not heard the rationale for the administration’s caution.

The Pentagon remains cautious about entering another Middle East war when it cannot control the outcome. And the passage of time has precluded some options.

Earlier in the conflict, some of Mr. Kerry’s own diplomats have said in recent months, it would have been possible to “crater” the runways used by Mr. Assad’s air force, making it impossible for planes to take off and drop barrel bombs. The United States has used that tactic since World War II, and it is unclear why it has not been employed in Syria.

Hillary Clinton, when she held Mr. Kerry’s post, argued for arming the Syrian rebels, a position joined by the C.I.A. director at the time, David H. Petraeus. But Mr. Obama was concerned — rightly, many others in the room at the time said — that there was no assurance that those rebels would not use the weapons for other purposes.

And as Mr. Kerry implicitly noted to his visitors on Tuesday, Russia’s entry into the conflict greatly complicates any American military intervention. The chances of accidental encounters that may turn deadly are considerable.

Mr. Kerry spoke again on Tuesday to his Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov, to find a way to enforce the cease-fire that the two men first announced in February. Russia wants a degree of coordination with United States forces, including shared use of intelligence, that gives the Pentagon chills.

Mr. Kerry knows he is in a race against time. Not only are more Syrians dying every day, but his own leverage in the negotiations is also waning. Mr. Assad may well be betting that he can wait out the end of the Obama administration.

Mr. Kerry publicly insists that is not the case. Asked last month in Vienna if Mr. Assad doubted that there was a “Plan B” for military action, Mr. Kerry said, “If you know that he’s come to a conclusion there’s no Plan B, then he’s come to a conclusion that is totally without any foundation whatsoever and even dangerous. Dangerous.”

Perhaps so, but Mr. Assad, by now, has most likely both read the dissent channel cable and heard Mr. Biden’s argument that the Joint Chiefs do not believe there are viable military options to force him into negotiating a peace.

As the eight dissenters left Mr. Kerry’s office, nothing seemed resolved. They all agreed to keep the details of their conversation private. But they also agreed that this was not the last word about a strategy that has left everyone — dissenters, the secretary of state and the president alike — frustrated that nothing has worked

Iran bad; Saudi Arabia worse; Turkmenistan worst of the three and the United States is helping the latter two: what gives?

The Foreign Affairs article, reprinted below,

• praises Iran's public for electing "moderates" to its governing bodies; 
• notes that the election goes a long way toward insuring the likelihood of success for President Obama's (and former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton's) Iranian Nuclear Deal, which congressional Republicans continue to try to frustrate;
• notes that the European Union is lifting sanctions on Iran at a faster pace than the United States is, for reasons unspecified -- and the article notes the eagerness with which European businesses (and indeed businesses from China to Basil) are  doing striving for business with Iran;
• argues  that the United States, alone of all nations, must retain the ability to impose biting sanctions on Iran;
•  worries that the unequal lifting of sanctions may harm the United States' ability to impose biting sanctions on Iran;
• and gives these reasons for maintaining a hard position toward  Iran:

[A]s Iran’s recent activities have shown, it is still a state supporter of terrorism, routinely abuses the human rights of its citizens, and is actively seeking to destabilize the Middle East. Aggressive enforcement of a robust sanctions regime will continue to allow the United States to pressure the country to abandon such activities.

Take the three points that make Iran different from countries that hold values different from the West's, in order presented:

1.  State Supporter of Terror  There is no internationally agreed definition of a terrorist; "terrorism" is in the eye of the beholder.

From the point of view of many Syrians, Salafi Jihadists funded by rich Saudi and the United Arab Emirates are terrorists.  From the point of view of Iranians, the United States is a terrorist state because it engineered the overthrow, by force, of a democratically elected president of Iran and installed an oppressive dictator  in his place.  Many Chileans and Argentinos would agree with Iranians on this, having suffered similar disruptions at the hands of the CIA.

Pakistan and India both got atomic bombs in violation of international protocols and neither is possible to be a rogue nation as Iran is.

The preference for one out of multiple standers on which to judge a nation's behavior,  picking the one uniquely designed to continue Iran's isolation, is not explained by the authors.  The preference is, however, a standard neoconic preference that appears frequently in neoconic writing.

2.  Routine Abuse of its Citizens.  The authors would do well to review  Foreign Affairs, Time to get Tough on Saudi Arabia, which details the kingdoms historic and present human rights abuses on its own coins  The us does not escape unblemished:  many Iraqi condem the IranWar and the us treatment of prisoners in its prisons in Iranians in Afghanistan.  Many United States citizens deplore that the United States has more prisoners than any other nation.

Iran is deprives citizens who dress in  way its authorities think gay men might dress, of life.  Saudi Arabia whips them before and after it hangs hem.  The United States them them both beat on gay and women's rights issues.


3.  Actively Seeks to Destabilize the Middle East.  The authors again resort to double standards.

Saudi Arabia seeks to replace the elected, multi-ethnic government of Syria, brutal beyond belief, with a brutal Wahhabist one.  That the Saudi desire to have their own form of religion rule all of Syria is one of the main reasons no settlement of the conflict has been possible.

See

Syria and the contending interests clearly described; why the outcomes mater, and to whom 

Are Iranians really worse for the United States than the Saudi?   Can we justify Saudi Arabia's genocide in Yemen?  If we punish one, shouldn't we punish both?  Shouldt we do our best to befriend the good in each?

And why are neocons so hard on Iran while turning a blind eye to failings in "friends?"  The United States has been punishing Iran for 7 decades because it had the the temerity to nationalize oil.

Time now to call a halt; take a hint from the European Union; relax sanctions; let Pakistan have as much natural gas from Ian's Pars Field as it wants; continue the move to join the community of nations.

SNAPSHOT March 1, 2016 IranSanctions

RAHEB HOMAVANDI / REUTERS

Iranians look at a list of candidates' names during elections for the parliament and Assembly of Experts, February 26, 2016.

SNAPSHOT March 1, 2016IranSanctions

Unfreezing Iran

And Doing It the Right Way

By Omar S. Bashir and Eric Lorber

239

It makes sense that moderates’ recent electoral triumph in Iran—early results suggest that they have won a majority of seats in the parliament and in the Assembly of Experts—will improve the chances of success for the Iran nuclear deal. Iranian moderates, who generally back President Hassan Rouhani, were an important factor in concluding the deal and are likely to support its continued implementation.

As U.S. policymakers welcome the news that the Obama administration’s signal foreign policy achievement may be on sturdier ground, however, the continued successful implementation of the deal is having important and unanticipated consequences for the United States’ ability to use biting financial sanctions to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

In particular, the nature of the sanctions relief provided as part of the Iran nuclear agreement—which seems less likely to unravel after the election—may actually undermine U.S. sanctions in the future, in part by encouraging foreign companies to re-enter Iranian markets and decrease their reliance on the U.S. financial system. It is worth taking that risk into consideration as some policymakers cheer the outcome of the election and what it may mean for Iranian politics and the future of the nuclear agreement.

TARGET PRACTICE

Observers have focused on the role that economic sanctions played in bringing Iran to the negotiating table and ultimately signing the nuclear agreement. But the use of powerful financial sanctions has a longer history.

The United States introduced targeted measures after 9/11 to stem the flow of funding to terrorist groups. These were soon adapted for use against weapons proliferators such as North Koreaand Iran. The Treasury Department, building off the framework established in the early 2000s, continued sharpening these tools and—under significant pressure from Congress, which wanted to increase the coercive pressure on Iran—began to rely more heavily on so-called secondary sanctions, that is, prohibitions on non-U.S. businesses or individuals that continue doing business with a sanctioned entity. In other words, foreign firms were given a choice between dealing with rogue regimes such as Iran and having access to the U.S. financial system.

In recent years, sanctions far removed from the economy-wide prohibitions of the 1990s have targeted human rights abusers and leaders who violate the territorial integrity of their neighbors. Some of these sanctions include creative new restrictions, such as prohibitions on issuing new debt and equity for certain targeted financial institutions and limits on cooperation for developing energy resources.

Policymakers have recognized the potential for such new sanctions to combat unconventional challenges as well. For example, U.S. President Barack Obama recently granted the secretary of the treasury the authority to impose economic sanctions on foreign countries and companies that engage in malicious cyber activity, namely launching cyberattacks on critical infrastructure or stealing commercially valuable information. Likewise, the United States has developed sanctions that target corruption in countries such as Venezuela andBelarus. In short, coercive economic measures have become the tool du jour. Today, U.S. officials are bullish about using more sophisticated and targeted sanctions when diplomacy alone is insufficient but force is not a feasible option.

UNSANCTIONED

Yet, as policymakers have become enamored with these tools, they have paid much less attention to how they can be unwound effectively—and what the specifics of the unwinding will mean for the United States’ ability to successfully use sanctions in the future. The implications are easy to see in the case of the sanctions relief provided to Iran on implementation day.

Whereas the EU and other states have largely relaxed their Iran sanctions programs, the United States has only discarded some of its restrictions. The different paces at which the United States and EU are unwinding their sanctions programs pushes European and Asian companies to avoid conducting transactions in U.S. dollars and in U.S. markets and so could diminish the United States’ ability to impose biting financial sanctions in the future.

Following implementation day, most EU sanctions and U.S. secondary sanctions—which applied to non-U.S. entities—were removed. European companies interested in doing business in Iran’s financial and banking industry (and its energy sector) are no longer prohibited from engaging in a wide range of activities. At the same time, extensive prohibitions remain on U.S. companies and individuals thinking about doing business in Iran, and European companies cannot use the American financial system for Iran-related transactions without running afoul of those sanctions.

The inability to access the U.S. financial system is a major impediment to foreign firms wishing to do business in Iran: transactions in U.S. dollars have long been the norm in most international markets and sectors, accounting for approximately 85 percent of global trade transactions, even when the parties involved are based outside the United States. By prohibiting firms from relying on the dollar to do business in Iran, the United States is giving those companies incentive to conduct transactions in other currencies, with potentially significant consequences for the preeminence of the U.S. financial system and the United States’ ability to impose financial sanctions.

For example, the State Bank of Pakistan has been asked by the Government of Pakistan to draw up an “interim credible payment mechanism” so that Pakistani businesses can enter Iran without worrying about dollars. South Korea is looking to encourage dealings with Iran in its own currency or else euros. Further, the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi recently announced that it wouldhandle payments by Japanese oil refiners to Iran in both yen and euros. Likewise, two other Japanese banks are reportedly looking to restart non-dollar wiring services to Iran as well. And Brazil’s trade minister recently announced that his government will look to enable payments in euros and other currencies to and from Iran because “everyone is racing after Iran now…the trade potential is very big.”

In short, governments and private actors around the world are experimenting with avoiding the dollar because of an unbalanced unwinding of the Iran sanctions.

These moves only continue a recent, larger trend of companies and countries avoiding the U.S. financial system. In the past few years, countries worried about being targeted by U.S. sanctions have begun developing alternative currency and payment systems. For example, many analysts believe that the recent Chinese push to make the renminbi a reserve currency was partly the result of a Chinese desire to ensure that the United States would not be able to bring significant coercive economic leverage to bear on China in the future. Similarly, China’s establishment of the China International Payment System (CHIPS)—a system designed to mimic SWIFT, which is an entity that helps coordinate the transfer of trillions of dollars in financial messages every day, and facilitate the processing of renminbi transactions—could insulate the country from the sanctions that proved so powerful against Iran.

The trend may also threaten U.S. economic competitiveness over the longer term. To the extent that international companies actively avoid the U.S. financial system, U.S. markets will no longer benefit from their business. While the extent of such potential damage is unclear, senior Treasury Department officials have expressed concern about these consequences.

And now, by giving foreign companies even more reason to use alternative currencies and financial markets the United States threatens to accelerate this trend. And that, in turn, could undercut the country’s ability to impose powerful financial sanctions in the future, since the United States often relies on the use of the dollar in cross-border transactions to create the jurisdictional hook necessary to impose biting sanctions. Without that hook, the United States will be less able to penalize companies that conduct business with rogue nations or terror groups.

FUTURE SANCTIONS

This is not to say that the United States should remove all of its sanctions on Iran just to match Europe. The United States has maintained those restrictions for good reason: as Iran’s recent activities have shown, it is still a state supporter of terrorism, routinely abuses the human rights of its citizens, and is actively seeking to destabilize the Middle East. Aggressive enforcement of a robust sanctions regime will continue to allow the United States to pressure the country to abandon such activities.

Policymakers and regulators tasked with protecting the U.S. financial system from exposure to illicit activity know that financial crimes, including bribery, other corruption, and money laundering, remain pervasive in the Islamic Republic. Iran ranked 130 of 167 countries in Transparency International’s 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index. U.S. officials know that allowing Iranian business to be conducted through the U.S. banking system might enable more such crimes.

But at the very least, policymakers need to recognize that they face a difficult choice. In their attempts to unwind certain sanctions on Iran while maintaining some economic pressure on the country, they may be hurting their ability to employ financial sanctions against Iran or other targets in the future. Given that policymakers have increasingly turned to these economic tools in recent years, they should understand the tradeoff and develop ways to maintain the United States’ ability to impose biting financial measures. Only then will it be able to preserve these powerful tools into the foreseeable future.

Saud- United Arab Emirates split; Saudi Arabia's intransigence; battle for Aleppo

The article reprinted here is especially interesting for this quotation:

 "It's the only game in town," says Yousef Al Otaiba, the United Arab Emirates' ambassador to Washington, of Kerry's diplomatic effort. "I don't see any other strategy for now."

The quotation suggests a split in the Gulf Cooperation Council ranks. I doubt hat Saudi Arabia agrees with a Kerry's cease fire efforts.

Will the United Arab Emirates use United States' mercenaries to train Syrian Sunni fighters in its name? The United Arab Emirates likely does't have the capability to train anyone on anything without the United States' mercenary help.

The article could do without the neoconic carping on the president’s “past mistakes in Syria.”  No sensible alternatives have been proposed, given Congressional Republicans’ recalcitrance. But blaming congressional Republicans isn’t a neoconic thing to do and the article's author is neoconic.

The basic problem in Syria is that the Saudi will not give up their billion dollar support for Salafi Jihadist fighters, their main hope of establishing a Wahhabist state in Syria (a horror for the Syrian people); nor their determination to keep Iran from transporting oil to Europe through Syria. 

The United States Congress is also unwilling to give up its decades-long effort to bottle up Iranian oil, at Saud bidding.  The president does not share that fading illusion and still must block the IP Pipeline in spite of  harming relations with Pakistan more.

A Pivotal Moment in a Tangled War

By David Ignatius

February 19, 2016

WASHINGTON -- Blaming President Obama for his past mistakes in Syria may be satisfying, and is largely deserved, but it's not a policy. This is the most complicated battlefield the world has seen in decades, and the next moves by the U.S. and its allies have to be deliberate, and carefully considered.

     The U.S. should move forward with the cease-fire process begun by Secretary of State John Kerry a week ago in Munich. Yes, it's a long shot, and woefully dependent on Russian "goodwill." But it offers a chance to reduce the suffering of the Syrian people and save lives, and it should be pursued awhile longer. If diplomacy fails, what comes next will be much worse for everyone.

     "It's the only game in town," says Yousef Al Otaiba, the United Arab Emirates' ambassador to Washington, of Kerry's diplomatic effort. "I don't see any other strategy for now."

     If Russia is sabotaging cease-fire hopes by continuing to bomb Syrian civilians, then the U.S. and its allies should focus international indignation on Moscow. Yes, Kerry may have been overly optimistic in making the Munich deal, but the Russians signed it -- and they should be held accountable if it fails.

     In the Syrian nightmare, even small steps forward are notable. So this week's move to send relief to five besieged areas around Damascus shouldn't be dismissed. This humanitarian assistance was part of the Munich agreement, and U.S. officials say the aid convoys moved into some of the towns on Wednesday. It's a fragile, first step toward de-escalation, but it's a positive sign.

     The "cessation of hostilities" that Kerry negotiated on paper was supposed to begin Friday, but it won't. That's partly because the Russians have continued their assaults on rebel areas. It's also partly because the opposition hasn't yet signaled clearly that it's willing to stand down. Given the opposition's weakness, this reluctance to embrace a truce is understandable, but it's wrong. Any chance to reduce violence and create space for political discussion should be seized.

     The battlefield around Aleppo is a mess -- a crosshatch of different combatants and foreign forces. Within a small area are Syrian regime forces backed by Russia and Iran; Kurdish rebel forces backed by the U.S.; Turkish forces that are shelling the U.S.-backed Kurds; Arab rebel fighters supported by the CIA and Saudi intelligence; Jabhat al-Nusra fighters allied with al-Qaeda; and Islamic State fighters, who want to kill all of the above.

     A full cease-fire in this landscape is impossible right now -- and not just because Kerry has been too trusting of the Russians. The combatants have to sort themselves out. Rebels will vote with their feet whether to ally with Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State. Saudi Arabia and other Arab patrons will have to lean hard on "moderate" rebels to pull them toward the cease-fire group and away from the terrorists.

     If the Russians keep bombing the rebels around Aleppo, willy-nilly, that will sabotage any hope of a truce. Here again, blame Moscow if it blocks de-escalation.

     Going forward, the U.S. needs more military leverage to match Russia. That may be coming, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE offering to send special forces into Syria, under overall U.S. command. Details are still being discussed, but the UAE appears willing to train Sunni fighters inside Syria -- helping to fill a hole in U.S. strategy. These forces might be part of an eventual strike against Raqqa, the Islamic State's self-proclaimed capital in eastern Syria.

     The U.S. campaign against the Islamic State continues, mostly invisibly. The key U.S. allies have been fighters from the Syrian Kurdish group known as the YPG, which has now been rebranded as the "Syrian Democratic Forces." This week, about 6,000 fighters moved to attack al-Shaddadi, a town about 50 miles east of Raqqa. This force included about 2,500 Arabs. Overall, the SDF umbrella group now numbers about 40,000, of which 7,000 are Arabs.

     The Syrian Kurds have been the toughest and most effective fighters in this conflict. Their success seems to have panicked Turkey, which claims the Syrian Kurds are terrorists. The Turks have been shelling YPG positions in northwest Syria -- even as these fighters (with quiet U.S. support) have been attacking Islamic State positions near Aleppo. What a crazy war -- with a NATO member (Turkey) attacking America's best allies in Syria (the Kurds)!

     The Syrian conflict is at a critical, delicate moment. A miscalculation by Russia or Turkey could be catastrophic. It's never too late for the U.S. to do the right thing -- which is to build, carefully, the political and military framework for a new Syria.

(c) 2016, Washington Post Writers Group

Great Powers stall Syrian peace talks

From a January 20, 2015, New York Times news article, Syria Talks Are Complicated by Competing Opposition Groups.  If you read the article, you may conclude hat the Syrian peace talks are  complicated not so much by competing groups, but by

• Turkey, which objects to Kurdish representation; 
• Saudi Arabia, which objets to any reprobation that isn't Salafist Jihadists; 
• Russia and Iran, which object to exclusion of Kurds, who are supported by Russia, Iran, a and the US; and 
• Iran, which objects to Salafist Jihadists determined to destroy Iran.

THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC UNION PARTY

The party, known as the P.Y.D., is the main Kurdish force in Syria. Its militia controls a substantial area in the northeast and along the Turkish border. Russia wanted the group to be invited to the Geneva talks, but Turkey, which is fighting a Kurdish insurgency of its own, raised strong objections. The Saudi-backed committee also objected, saying it should be the sole opposition representative. The party’s leader, Saleh Muslim, said on Tuesday that no Syrian Kurdish officials had been invited to the Geneva talks.

 See here, and here,  for more on the obstacles to peace in Syria.  Plenty of blame to go around, and oil is at the center of it:

Russia objects to Qatar's oil going to Europe through Syria because Qatar's competition would destroy Russia's oil-based economy and Qatar wants a pipeline through Syria;

the Gulf dictators snd the US have blocked Iranian oil since Iran nationalized its oil five decades ago and old habits are hard to break even after they make no sense; they object to Iran's desire for a pipeline through Syria to deliver oil to Europe;

Russia finds Iranian oil  less objectionable than Qatar's since it would find Iran more amenable to price fixing that Qatar, it thinks.

The folks fighting on the ground are sectarian ideologues or are mercenaries beholden to one Great Power or another, except for the admirable Kurds,  who are communitarian, egalitarian, feminist and the most effective fighters in the regain.

No wonder that all except the Turks wish to arm them.